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INTRODUCTION
Time and time again, it has been shown to be important, for both
business and society, for individuals to speak up when they encounter
problems or wrongdoing in the workplace. The scandal at WorldCom broke
only after employees spoke up and publicly “blew the whistle” on
executives.1 An Enron employee reported problems to the IRS in 1999, long
before the firm’s failure in 2001 and, some speculate, early enough to avoid
a total failure of the firm.2 In the wake of scandal, Volkswagen offered
internal immunity to employees who blew the whistle regarding cheating on
emissions tests and requirements.3 In an effort to weed out the wrongdoers
and put the company on a path toward recovery, Siemens offered immunity
for whistleblowing employees when a scandal broke in connection with
massive international bribery.4
Research also demonstrates the importance of employee voice, which
sometimes takes the form of whistleblowing, for individual employee wellbeing. When employees feel unable to exercise their voice at work, there
can be serious negative impacts for psychological and physical well-being.5
Despite the negative impact of employee silence for both organizations and
1. See Susan Pulliam & Deborah Solomon, How Three Unlikely Sleuths Discovered
Fraud at WorldCom, WALL ST. J., Oct. 30, 2002,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1035929943494003751 [https://perma.cc/QEM5-SKYG]
(offering detailed background on the whistleblowing at WorldCom).
2. See David S. Hilzenrath, IRS Pays Enron Whistleblower $1.1 Million, WASH. POST,
Mar. 15, 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/irs-pays-enronwhistleblower-11-million/2011/03/15/ABFLAEb_story.html [https://perma.cc/X5Y5UVQY] (quoting the whistleblower’s lawyer).
3. Jack Ewing & Julie Creswell, Volkswagen, Offering Amnesty, Asks Workers to
Come Forward on Emissions Cheating, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 2015,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/13/business/volkswagen-offering-amnesty-asks-workersto-come-forward-on-emissions-cheating.html [https://perma.cc/42V3-D5ZQ].
4. Mike Esterl, Siemens Amnesty Plan Assists Bribery Probe, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2008,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120465805725710921 [https://perma.cc/F882-HTSL].
5. See Michael Knoll & Rolf van Dick, Do I Hear the Whistle . . . ? A First Attempt to
Measure Four Forms of Employee Silence and Their Correlates, 113 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 349,
353 (2013) (examining the correlation between different forms of employee silence and wellbeing); Leslie A. Perlow & Stephanie Williams, Is Silence Killing Your Company?, 81 HARV.
BUS. REV. 52, 52 (2003) (“[S]ilence can exact a high psychological price on individuals,
generating feelings of humiliation, pernicious anger, resentment, and the like.”). See also,
Michael Knoll & Rolf van Dick, Authenticity, Employee Silence, Prohibitive Voice, and the
Moderating Effect of Organizational Identification, 8 J. POSITIVE PSYCHOL. 346, 346 (2013)
(discussing the psychological effects of authenticity and linking authenticity to employee
voice); Fons Naus et al., Organizational Cynicism: Extending the Exit, Voice, Loyalty and
Neglect Model of Employees’ Responses to Adverse Conditions in the Workplace, 60 HUM.
REL. 683, 683-685 (2007) (suggesting that a company culture that encourages employees to
be engaged will have a positive impact on employees’ well-being).
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employees, the reality is that there are often a number of serious barriers to
speaking up in the workplace, including risking potential negative
employment repercussions, such as termination.6
The risk of termination is especially realistic in jurisdictions where
employment-at-will is the legal norm. Employment-at-will gives employers
and employees the right to terminate employment at any time, with or
without reason, provided the reason is not illegal, without legal
consequence.7 In the United States, employment-at-will is the applicable
legal standard when there is not an employment contract, such as a collective
bargaining agreement, executive contract, or other specific contract terms
granting employment for a specific period of time.8 There are exceptions to
the doctrine,9 but the reality is that most employment in the United States is
at-will.10
In addition, employee protections provided by collective bargaining
agreements may be on the decline. The U.S. Supreme Court recently heard
the case of Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, in which a
mandatory payment of union dues was at issue.11 The Court ultimately
deadlocked on the issue, and thus the ruling of the lower court permitting
mandatory union dues stands.12 Yet some fear that the protection of unions
will be a relic of the past if the Supreme Court decides in a later case that
assessment of mandatory union dues is unconstitutional.13 Twenty-eight
6. E.g., Elizabeth W. Morrison, Employee Voice Behavior: Integration and Directions
for Future Research, 5 ACAD. OF MGMT. ANNALS 373, 383 (2011) (discussing negative
personal outcomes as one of numerous barriers to speaking up in the workplace); Frances J.
Milliken et al., An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues that Employees Don’t
Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J. OF MGMT. STUD. 1453, 1469 (2003) (explaining that
fear of negative labels is one cause of employee silence in the workplace).
7. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM.
J. OF LEGAL HIST. 118, 118 (1976) (discussing how employment-at-will can be terminated
with notice); Lobosco v. N.Y. Tel. Co./NYNEX, 96 N.Y. 2d 312, 312 (2d Cir. 2001) (denying
an employees’ motion to dismiss despite his claim that he was being retaliated against for
blowing the whistle); CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (Deering 2016) (stating that employees in
California may be terminated at will).
8. RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW: EMPLOYMENT CONTRACTS: TERMINATION §§
2.01-2.02 (AM. LAW. INST. 2015).
9. LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, Ch. 259, §§ 259.03-259.06 (Matthew Bender).
10. Id. at § 259.02.
11. Friedrichs v. Cal. Teachers Ass’n, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188995, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
Dec 5, 2013) (ordering judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendant, who compelled
employees to support a specific collective bargaining agreement), aff’d by, Friedrichs v. Cal.
Teachers Ass’n, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 24935 (9th Cir. Cal. Nov. 18, 2014); Luis v. U.S.,
136 U.S. 1083 (2016).
12. Id.
13. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Janus v. American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, Council 31, No.: 16-1466, 2017 U.S. LEXIS 4459 (cert.
granted Sept. 28, 2017). This case presents another challenge to the constitutionality of
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states14 and the territory of Guam15 have already established “right-to-work”
laws declaring the compulsory joining of unions illegal, and U.S. federal
government employees also have a similar protection.16
This paper argues that the current legal environment may negatively
impact employees’ willingness to exercise their voice in the workplace. To
benefit the firm, the employees, and society, employers must adopt practices
that provide employees a safe place to exercise their voice, despite the
restrictive legal environment in which employees work. To this end, this
paper connects the literature on employee voice and silence to the
employment law presumptions about at-will employment, examining the
negative impact these presumptions may have on employee voice. The paper
then proposes that employers implement effective avenues for employee
voice and internal whistleblowing, which allow employees to trust that their
concerns will be heard, and suggests that doing so will provide positive
benefits to both the firm and society.
This paper is organized as follows. Part I discusses the importance and
role of employee voice, as well as some of the negative consequences
associated with stifling voice. Part II discusses the legal environment of
employment-at-will in the United States, which may play a large part in
repressing employee voice. In Part III, the significance, benefits, and perils
of whistleblowing as an aspect of voice are discussed and analyzed, and
recent efforts to restrict whistleblowing are critiqued. Part IV continues with
proposals for positive business practices to encourage worker voice followed
by our concluding remarks.
I.

SIGNIFICANCE OF VOICE

A. Theoretical Overview
The current research on employee voice spans across a variety of fields
and topic domains, some of which are developing independently of each
other.17 Research that focuses on employee voice comes from a variety of
sources including the literatures on organizational behavior, industrial
relations (IR), and human resource management (HRM). More specifically,
mandatory union agency fees.
14. Right to Work Frequently-Asked Questions, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF.
FOUND., http://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions/
[https://perma.cc/85Q8-FAXU] (last visited May 10, 2017).
15. See 22 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 4101-4114 (2000) (prohibiting employers from
requiring union participation).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (1978).
17. Michael R. Bashshur & Burak Oc, When Voice Matters: A Multilevel Review of the
Impact of Voice in Organizations, 41 J. MGMT. 1530, 1531 (2015).
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employee voice is considered an important factor in research on justice,
proactive/prosocial work behavior, decision-making, and feedback.18
Three primary research streams can be said to dominate research on
voice. One stream, deriving from Albert Hirschman’s work, Exit, Voice, and
Loyalty, views employee voice as a constructive response to dissatisfaction
and alienation in the workplace.19 Another more nascent research stream
contends that voice is not necessarily a result of dissatisfaction; rather, it is
an other-oriented behavior intended to promote the effective functioning of
the organization.20 Finally, more recent research on employee silence
similarly views employee voice as a constructive behavior aimed at helping
organizations solve problems, but it focuses on understanding some of the
systemic obstacles to engaging in voice from an employee’s perspective.
1. Voice to Communicate Dissatisfaction
Although it has declined in popularity,21 the Exit/Voice/Loyalty/
Neglect (EVLN) model—an extension of Hirschman’s “exit/voice/loyalty”
model—still illuminates the analyses of employee voice in the industrial
relations and human resource management fields.22
The model
conceptualizes voice as one of four response categories to dissatisfaction or
alienation in the workplace: (1) exit, (2) voice, (3) loyalty, and (4) neglect.23
Exit and voice are both active methods of communicating dissatisfaction;
voice is constructive and thus preferable to exit, which is considered
destructive and inefficient.24 Loyalty and neglect are passive responses:
loyalty reflects hope of recovery whereas neglect accepts that recovery is not
possible.25 In the workplace, neglect can be manifested in a variety of

18. Id. at 1542-45.
19. E.g., Hsin-Hua Hsiung, Authentic Leadership and Employee Voice Behavior: A
Multi-Level Psychological Process, 107 J. BUS. ETHICS 349, 350 (2012) (noting two separate
streams of employee voice research, including the Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect research
and extra-role-behavior research).
20. Id.
21. See Elizabeth W. Morrison, Employee Voice and Silence, 1 ANN. REV.
ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. & ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 173, 176 (2014) [hereinafter
Employee Voice and Silence] (noting the history of research of voice and silence).
22. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1536 (noting an analysis of HRM and ILR on
the results of the effect of unionized voice on job attitude).
23. See generally Dan Farrell, Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and Neglect as Responses to Job
Dissatisfaction: A Multidimensional Scaling Study, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 596 (1983)
(discussing a study that focuses on workers’ responses to job dissatisfaction).
24. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984)
(conducting studies that find that individuals in unions keep their jobs longer than those who
are not in unions).
25. Id.
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negative behaviors, including a lack of apparent interest or motivation, an
increase in mistakes, absenteeism, and exploiting an organization’s time for
personal affairs.26 The belief is that allowing employees to exercise their
voice can improve the situation that is the cause of the employee alienation
or dissatisfaction, and employees will subsequently become more satisfied
with working conditions and less likely to quit the organization.27 When the
opportunity for voice is lacking but employees do not have the option to quit,
they tend to withdraw and slip into neglect.
Proponents of this model tend to operationalize voice in terms of the
presence or absence of formal and informal voice mechanisms. Although
the most commonly studied manifestation of voice mechanisms in this
literature is union representation,28 other examples of voice mechanisms
include grievance filing, whistleblowing, informal complaints, and
participation in suggestion systems.29
2. Voice Mechanisms as an Opportunity to Create Perceived Justice
In the organizational justice context, opportunities for employee voice
are viewed as a desirable structural feature of organizational procedures and
policies that provides employees with a perceived chance to express their
views to decision-makers.30 Research on “process control,” or the voice
effect, has been particularly influential in the study of employee voice.31
Process control was first observed by Thibault and Walker in their studies of
dispute resolution in legal settings. They found that perceived control over
the procedures that led to decisions made the procedures seem more fair,

26. Caryl E. Rusbult et al., Impact of Exchange Variables on Exit, Voice, Loyalty, and
Neglect: An Integrative Model of Responses to Declining Job Satisfaction, 31 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 599, 601 (1988).
27. See generally FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 24 (theorizing that unionized
individuals will be less likely to quit because grievance procedures provide a voice
mechanism). Empirical studies have provided some support for this theory. See Derek R.
Avery et al., Does Voice Go Flat? How Tenure Diminishes the Impact of Voice, 50 HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. 147 (2011) (finding a negative relationship between union presence and
employee turnover); Roderick D. Iverson & Douglas B. Currivan, Union Participation, Job
Satisfaction, and Employee Turnover: An Event-History Analysis of the Exit-Voice
Hypothesis, 42 INDUS. REL. 101 (finding a negative relationship between union presence and
employee intentions to quit).
28. See generally sources cited at supra notes 17-26.
29. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1532 (outlining voice in management research
and outcomes).
30. Robert J. Bies & Debra L. Shapiro, Voice and Justification: Their Influence on
Procedural Fairness Judgments, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 676, 676 (1988).
31. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1532 (outlining studies on process control and
noting that process control is otherwise known as voice effect).
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regardless of actual outcome.32 Other studies have also found a positive
relationship between process control and the perceived fairness of
outcomes.33
Perhaps one of the most well-known models of procedural justice is the
“group value” model, which suggests that people value their membership in
groups because groups “offer symbols of identity, economic resources, and
a way of validating behavior.”34 Fair procedures make members of the group
feel valued.35 Employee voice opportunities are thus positively linked with
outcomes because they reduce uncertainty, increase individuals’ felt control
over the processes that lead to outcomes, and make individuals feel like
valued members of the organization.36
3. The Pro-Social Conceptualization of Employee Voice
The proactive work behavior literature conceptualizes voice as a
behavior, rather than in terms of the presence of voice-granting mechanisms
or perceived voice opportunities.37 Central to this research stream is the idea
that the underlying motivation for employee voice is pro-social in nature.38
That is, employee “[v]oice is motivated by the desire to bring about
constructive change for the organization or for one or more stakeholders.”39
An employee is therefore more likely to engage in voice behaviors to the
extent that she has a strong desire or sense of obligation to help the
organization operate more effectively or appropriately via its employees,
clients, or the external community.40 As noted by Professor Morrison,
empirical studies have provided support for this idea by “showing a
32. Id.
33. Yochi Cohen-Charash & Paul E. Spector, The Role of Justice in Organizations: A
Meta-Analysis, 86 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 278, 284-86
(2001); Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice at the Millennium: A Meta-Analytic Review of 25
years of Organizational Justice Research, 86 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 425, 436 (2001).
34. Stefanie E. Naumann & Nathan Bennett, A Case for Procedural Justice Climate:
Development and Test of a Multilevel Model, 43 ACAD. MGMT. J. 881, 881 (2000).
35. See generally Tom R. Tyler & E. Allan Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in
Groups, 25 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115 (1992) (noting the social
psychology of procedural justice).
36. Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1532-33.
37. Thomas W.H. Ng & Daniel C. Feldman, Employee Voice Behavior: A Meta-Analytic
Test of the Conservation of Resources Framework, 33 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 216, 217
(2012).
38. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 180.
39. Id. at 179-80; see also Linn Van Dyne & Jeffrey A. LePine, Helping and Voice ExtraRole Behaviors: Evidence of Construct and Predictive Validity, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 108, 109
(1998) (defining voice as a “promotive behavior that emphasizes expression of constructive
challenge intended to improve rather than merely criticize.”).
40. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 180.
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relationship between employee voice and a variety of internal motivational
states reflecting a sense of commitment to the well-being of one’s
organization, coworkers, or customers.”41
Many scholars in this area also conceive of voice as a type of
organizational citizenship behavior.42 But unlike some other organizational
citizenship behaviors, voice is often seen as challenging rather than
affiliatory, especially to managers and particularly when it is aimed at
disrupting the status quo.43 Furthermore, voice can only have positive effects
when it reaches a target with the power to take action; this contrasts with
other organizational citizenship behaviors, which generally do not require
approval or action from above to have positive effects.44 Thus, engaging in
voice involves an element of personal risk for an employee, who may
jeopardize her relationships with colleagues and supervisors by engaging in
voice.
B. The Impact of Voice
Employee voice opportunities have been linked to numerous positive
psychological, relational, and health-related outcomes. For the individual
employee, the positive outcomes associated with perceiving that one has
opportunities to “voice” one’s concerns in the workplace include improved
justice perceptions, better job attitudes, and increased satisfaction at work.45
Positive outcomes such as team learning, improved work processes and
innovation, and even crisis prevention have been observed at the unit and
organizational levels.46 Further, the suppression of voice behaviors and the
perceived lack of voice opportunities can create feelings of stress, loss of
control and loss of self-efficacy.47
Paradoxically, no significant correlation has been found between voice
behaviors and objective performance (including both financial performance

41. Id.
42. See, e.g., James R. Detert et al., Voice Flows to and Around Leaders: Understanding
When Units Are Helped or Hurt by Employee Voice, 58 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 624, 626 (2013)
(“Voice is a challenging, prosocial, organizational citizenship behavior specifically intended
to be instrumental in improving the organization by changing existing practices.”).
43. Subrahmaniam Tangirala & Rangaraj Ramanujam, Exploring Nonlinearity in
Employee Voice: The Effects of Personal Control and Organizational Identification, 51
ACAD. MGMT. J. 1189, 1192 (2008).
44. Id. at 1191.
45. Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1531.
46. Jian Liang et al., Psychological Antecedents of Promotive and Prohibitive Voice: A
Two-Wave Examination, 55 ACAD. MGMT. J. 71, 73 (2012).
47. E. W. Morrison & F. J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change and
Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 706, 721 (2000).
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and productivity rates),48 although some empirical studies49 suggest that
when voice is heard but ignored, employee output substantially decreases.50
One reason why there may be no observed positive relationship between
voice behavior and objective performance measures is that the relationship
is likely to be complex. That is, the relationship between voice behaviors
and outcomes such as financial performance is likely to be both mediated
and moderated by a number of factors, including the nature of the voice both
in terms of content and delivery, the degree of management openness to the
voice efforts, the reactions to the voicing attempt, whether the problem is
solved, and the felt outcomes of voice for the employee. Also, mediating the
relationship between voice and performance outcomes are more proximal
outcomes of voice such as its effects on employee well-being, employee
commitment, and the degree of trust across levels of the hierarchy.
1. Psychological Well-Being
Voice, whether characterized as a behavior or in terms of the
availability of voice mechanisms, has been positively associated with
numerous facets of psychological well-being, such as job satisfaction,
outcome satisfaction, and organizational commitment.51 Furthermore,
employee satisfaction has been shown to increase when a greater number of
voice mechanisms are available.52
Many of the positive individual-level attitudinal and behavioral effects
48. Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1534.
49. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 188 (discussing studies that show
how employee voice being ignored can be detrimental and comparing Scott E. Seibert et al.,
What do Proactive People Do? A Longitudinal Model Linking Proactive Personality and
Career Success, 54 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 845 (2001) with Steven W. Whiting et al., Effects
of Task Performance, Helping, Voice and Organizational Loyalty on Performance Appraisal
Ratings, 93 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 125 (2008)).
50. See James E. Hunton et al., A Field Experiment Examining the Effects of Membership
in Voting Majority and Minority Subgroups and the Ameliorating Effects of Postdecisional
Voice, 81 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 806 (1996) (describing a field study using eighty employees to
examine the consequences of membership in voting majority and minority subgroups after
trying to fix the negative outcome of the minority subgroup’s decision).
51. See Colquitt et al., supra note 33, at 436 (finding a positive relationship between voice
opportunities and outcome satisfaction, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment);
Jeffrey P. Thomas et al., Employee Proactivity in Organizations: A Comparative MetaAnalysis of Emergent Proactive Constructs, 83 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL
PSYCHOL. 275, 289 (2010) (finding a positive relationship between informal voice behaviors
and job satisfaction and affective organizational commitment); Ng & Feldman, supra note 37,
at 221 (finding a negative relationship between informal voice behaviors and affective
detachment from the organization and organizational disidentification).
52. But see, e.g., Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1536 (noting that many studies report
a negative relationship between union representation and dissatisfaction).
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of voice can be linked to an individual’s perception of personal control. In
the organizational justice literature, the availability of opportunities to
provide input has been closely linked with an employee’s sense of personal
control in the workplace.53 In this context, personal control is defined as an
employee’s subjective belief in “her ability to effect a change, in a desired
direction, on the environment.”54 Given the amount of time people spend at
work,55 it is unsurprising that employees wish to see themselves as active
members of the organization, rather than passive cogs in the machine.56 By
voluntarily engaging in change-oriented behaviors, employees are able to
assert their sense of personal control.57 In contrast, lack of personal control
is associated with an assortment of detrimental individual outcomes, such as
dissatisfaction, stress, decreased performance, withdrawal symptoms,
destructive tendencies, and even sabotage.58
Organizational justice scholars have also found a positive relationship
between voice opportunities and perceived fairness; employees who
perceive that they have input into procedures and outcomes are likely to view
such procedures and outcomes as fairer.59 If employees have more
opportunities to provide work-related input, they have a greater sense of
control, which increases the expectancy of effectively resolving workplace
problems and issues through personal action.60 They may also feel more like
valued members of the organization if they perceive that they are treated
fairly at the workplace.61 It is important, however, that voice opportunities
be legitimate; when employees’ voices are heard but ignored, dissatisfaction
53. In organizational justice literature, “process control” is near-synonymous with the
ability to provide input in the procedures that lead to outcomes. See, e.g., Colquitt et al., supra
note 33, at 426-28 (defining process control as a perception of procedural fairness).
54. David B. Greenberger & Stephen Strasser, Development and Application of a Model
of Personal Control in Organizations, 11 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 164, 165 (1986).
55. In 2015, people who worked spent an average of 7.6 hours per day on work and workrelated activities. American Time Use Survey—2015 Results, U.S. Dep’t of Labor (June 24,
2016, 10:00 AM), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf [https://perma.cc/7D2WCGCN].
56. Richard DeCharms, PERSONAL CAUSATION: THE INTERNAL AFFECTIVE
DETERMINANTS OF BEHAVIOR at 274 (1968); Greenberger & Strasser, supra note 54, at 426,
435.
57. Blake E. Ashforth & Alan M. Saks, Personal Control in Organizations: A
Longitudinal Investigation with Newcomers, 53 HUMAN REL. 311, 327-28 (2000).
58. Greenberger & Strasser, supra note 54, at 164.
59. Cohen-Charash & Spector, supra note 33, at 284-86.
60. Jerry B. Fuller et al., Promoting Felt Responsibility for Constructive Change and
Proactive Behavior: Exploring Aspects of an Elaborated Model of Work Design, 27 J.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1089, 1091 (2006); Sharon K. Parker et al., “That’s Not My Job”:
Developing Flexible Employee Work Orientations, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 899, 903-04 (1997).
61. E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE,
at 173-202 (1988).
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increases,62 and productivity decreases.63
Employees who consciously suppress their work-related thoughts,
opinions, and suggestions because they believe that will not be valued may
experience cognitive dissonance;64 they believe that they have something
important to express, but by remaining silent, their behavior is at odds with
that belief.65 Employees experiencing cognitive dissonance are predicted to
be in a state of emotional tension, which increases stress and exacerbates
stress-related outcomes. To resolve this dissonance, either their lack of voice
or their beliefs must change, but as mentioned, the perceived risks associated
with voicing their concerns create a significant barrier to engaging in voice
behaviors.66 As a result, an employee is more likely to resolve dissonance
by reducing her belief about the importance of the issue she wishes to speak
about, disassociating from the organization, or viewing herself as being a
person who holds little influence, leading to “neglect” in the words of the
EVLN model.67
2. Relationships
Constructive voice behaviors signal employee commitment and
concern for the organization. According to social exchange theory,
managers should recognize and reward employees who express voice.68
However, studies tying voice behaviors to relational outcomes have
produced less uniformly positive results.69 In reality, individuals may not be
so receptive to input—particularly when it is perceived as criticism from
someone lower in the organizational hierarchy. Recent studies suggest that
the impact of voice depends on the content of the message and how it is
communicated. For example, Steven Whiting and colleagues found that

62. Robert Folger et al., Effects of “Voice” and Peer Opinions on Responses to Inequity,
37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2253, 2254-55 (1979).
63. A field experiment placed eighty employees into voting majority and minority
subgroups. In the absence of post-decisional voice, members of the minority subgroup
perceived the decision as less fair and produced forty-one percent less output than members
of the voting majority subgroup. See Hunton et al., supra note 50, at 806 (investigating the
role of post-decisional voice to improve attitudinal differences and performance).
64. Id.
65. LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 9-14 (1957).
66. Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 721.
67. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1547 (explaining that neglect is an outcome of
an employee who feels that her voice has been ignored).
68. Bashshur & Oc, supra note 17, at 1533.
69. See Steven W. Whiting et al., Effects of Message, Source, and Context on Evaluations
of Employee Voice Behavior, 97 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 159, 159 (2012) (citing evidence to
support the finding that voice leads to slower salary growth and a reduced likelihood of
promotion).
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employers perceive voice more positively when it provides a solution, it is
given early in the process, it comes from a person who is viewed as
trustworthy and an expert in the relevant area, and there is a norm for
speaking up in the organization.70 Employees who are able to effectively
regulate their emotions while engaging in voice also receive better
performance evaluations.71 In contrast, a 2001 study found a negative
relationship between proactive voice and career progression; the authors
argued that employees whose proactive voice focuses on problems without
providing innovative solutions may damage their workplace relations and, in
turn, their own careers.72
Thus, providing employees with perceived voice opportunities has been
hypothesized and often found to have positive consequences for employees
in terms of their perceptions of control and fairness and resulting sense of
commitment to the organization. However, managers are often less positive
in their judgments of employees who exercise the opportunity to speak up
about sources of dissatisfaction or even suggestions for improvement.
3. Health
Although the impact of voice on health-related outcomes has not been
rigorously tested,73 related studies on stress suggest that stifling voice may
also have serious psychological and physical health effects.74 In 1979,
Robert Karasek first observed that personal control (as measured by latitude
in decision-making) moderates the relationship between work and stress.75
Feelings of work-related unfairness, work-related dissatisfaction, lack of
trust in the organization,76 and the suppression of work-related emotions77
have all been described as examples of occupational stressors and strains.
Research provides abundant evidence that high levels of workplace
stress are likely to lead to health problems, increased likelihood of accidents,
and burnout.78 Further, workplace stress may increase absenteeism, result in
70. Id.
71. Adam M. Grant, Rocking the Boat but Keeping it Steady: The Role of Emotion
Regulation in Employee Voice, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1703, 1709 (2013).
72. Seibert et al., supra note 49, at 864-68.
73. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 179.
74. Robert Karasek, Job Demands, Job Decision Latitude, and Mental Strain:
Implications for Job Redesign, 24 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 285, 302-04 (1979).
75. Id.
76. Ng & Feldman, supra note 37, at 221.
77. See, e.g., JAMES W. PENNEBAKER, OPENING UP: THE HEALING POWER OF EXPRESSING
EMOTIONS 9 (1997) (describing the suppression of emotions as a stressor that has mental and
physical health implications).
78. James B. Avey et al., Psychological Capital: A Positive Resource for Combating
Employee Stress & Turnover, 48 HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 677, 679 (2008).
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reduced productivity at work, and result in destructive patterns in the context
of work.79 Stress-induced medical conditions include bodily pains,
dizziness, headaches, heart disease, asthma, and hypertension.80 Chronic
stress may weaken an individual’s immune system and induce a state in
which the body no longer has the capacity to adapt to stress, leading to high
blood pressure, heart attacks, chronic fatigue, psychosis, and symptoms of
depression.81 Studies of workplace-related stress have shown that employees
experiencing chronic stress may develop physical symptoms (such as
unstable blood pressure, muscle tension, and headaches) and psychological
symptoms (such as the decreased ability to concentrate and retain
information, substance abuse, and clinical depression).82 Stress may also
exacerbate existing medical conditions,83 particularly in the case of chronic
stress.84 Once ill, stress also makes recovery from illness more difficult. 85
The adverse health effects of workplace stress are reflected in increasingly
high individual and organizational health care costs.86 A 2016 study focusing
on workplace stressors found that 120,000 deaths per year and five to eight
percent of annual healthcare costs may be attributable to how U.S.
companies manage their employees.87
C. Voice and Silence
Voice is conceptualized differently across literatures. Early work on
employee voice characterized it as a constructive response to work-related
dissatisfaction; employees who are unhappy with their jobs may voice their
concerns, exit the organization, or remain hopeful that work conditions will
change.88 More recently, scholars have tended to describe voice as a
79. Thomas W. Colligan & Eileen M. Higgins, Workplace Stress: Etiology &
Consequences, 21 J. WORKPLACE BEHAV. HEALTH 89, 93 (2006).
80. Id. at 91.
81. Id. at 92.
82. Id. at 93.
83. See, e.g., Beverly E. Thorn et al., A Randomized Clinical Trial of Targeted Cognitive
Behavioral Treatment to Reduce Catastrophizing in Chronic Headache Sufferers, 8 J. PAIN
938, 946-48 (2007) (finding that sufferers experienced fewer chronic headaches after
suppressing stress-causing behaviors).
84. How Stress Affects Your Health, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
http://www.apa.org/helpcenter/stress-facts.pdf [https://perma.cc/JF3G-67ME] (last visited
Sept. 9, 2016).
85. Id.
86. See Colligan & Higgins, supra note 79, at 96 (linking workplace stress to increased
cost of benefits to the employer).
87. Joel Goh et al., The Relationship Between Workplace Stressors and Mortality and
Health Costs in the United States, 62 MGMT. SCI. 608, 608 (2016).
88. See FREEMAN & MEDOFF, supra note 24, at 247 (finding that the voice that unionism
provides to its members serves as a source of both social and economic good).
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behavior that is informal, extra-role, and pro-social.89 Voice has been
defined as “the informal and discretionary communication by an employee
of ideas, suggestions, concerns, or information about problems . . . to
persons who might be able to take appropriate action, with the intent to bring
about improvement or change.”90 For our purposes, voice may be expressed
informally, or via mechanisms such as grievance procedures or union
membership. Silence, on the other hand, refers to the withholding of
information from persons perceived to be able to take appropriate action.91
It is important to note that silence is not merely the absence of voice, as “not
speaking up can occur for many reasons, including having nothing
meaningful to convey.”92 Similarly, the presence of voice behaviors does
not imply the absence of intentional silence.93
Although scholars have taken different approaches to operationalizing
and explaining employee voice, most agree on two matters: first, employee
voice is beneficial;94 and second, employees who are presented with a “latent
voice opportunity”—that is, employees who possess potentially relevant or
important work-related knowledge, opinions, concerns, or ideas95–often
choose to remain silent.96 Next, we analyze the inhibitors of employee voice
and motivators of employee silence.
1. Barriers to Voice
In a recent study, 461 individuals were asked to describe occasions
when they had intentionally stayed silent in response to an important workrelated issue and their motives for doing so.97 The most frequently expressed
motivations for silence were that they “did not think it would do any good to

89. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 174.
90. Frances J. Milliken et al., Linking Workplace Practices to Community Engagement:
The Case for Encouraging Employee Voice, 29 ACAD. MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 405, 409-10
(2015) (quoting Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 174).
91. Craig C. Pinder and Karen P. Harlos, Employee Silence: Quiescence and
Acquiescence as Responses to Perceived Injustice, 20 RES. IN PERS. AND HUM. RESOURCES
MGMT. 331, 334 (2001); Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 174.
92. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 174.
93. Chad T. Brinsfield, Employee Silence Motives: Investigation of Dimensionality and
Development of Measures, 34 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 671, 672 (2013).
94. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 177.
95. Id. at 179.
96. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Kish-Gephart et al., Silenced by Fear: The Nature, Sources, and
Consequences of Fear at Work, 29 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 163, 165 (2009)
(“Employees frequently remain silent in moments that call for voice, whether about matters
relating to employee treatment . . . managerial behavior . . . or the outbreak and spread of
corporate scandal.”).
97. Brinsfield, supra note 93, at 674.
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speak up,” wished to avoid conflict, and feared negative consequences.98
These motivations echo findings from previous employee interviews and
surveys regarding employee voice, which appear to corroborate two
principles: first, many employees are hesitant to speak up about work-related
issues; and second, the two primary perceptions that inhibit voice are the fear
of negative consequences at the workplace and doubts about the utility of
engaging in voice.99 Of course, whether an employee does engage in voice
will likely be influenced by a wide variety of factors, including individual
dispositional idiosyncrasies such as self-esteem, extraversion, and
neuroticism.100 However, two key influencers of the “voice choice,”
perceived risk and utility, are common across individuals.101
a. Risk
Engaging in change-oriented voice is risky because it inherently
involves a challenge to the status quo. An employee may fear that by
speaking up in a way that challenges work practices and decisions or that
highlights a serious problem, she will be viewed as a troublemaker or
complainer, lose respect or support from others at work, and face negative
98. See id. at 676 (listing the frequency of given reasons for remaining silent per
participants’ open-ended responses).
99. For a concise summary of surveys regarding employees’ reluctance to engage in
voice and their rationales for not doing so, see Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at
178. In particular, a 1991 study found that over seventy percent of employees surveyed felt
afraid to speak up about certain issues. Id.
100. Empirical studies in the pro-social behavior literature have identified a wide variety
of dispositional and attitudinal factors as antecedents to, or moderating variables affecting,
employee voice. See, e.g., Joel Brockner et al., The Moderating Effect of Self-Esteem in
Reaction to Voice: Converging Evidence From Five Studies, 75 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 394, 404 (1998) (analyzing self-esteem); Fuller et al., supra note 60, at 1090-91
(focusing on felt obligation for constructive change); Liang et al., supra note 46, at 71
(examining psychological safety, felt obligation for constructive change, and organizationbased self-esteem); J. Michael Crant et al., Dispositional Antecedents of Demonstration and
Usefulness of Voice Behavior, 26 J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 285, 285 (2010) (defining the dimensions
of personality in the Five-Factor model: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion,
agreeableness, and neuroticism); Subrahmaniam Tangirala et al., Doing Right Versus Getting
Ahead: The Effects of Duty and Achievement Orientations on Employees’ Voice, 98 J. APPL.
PSYCHOL. 1040, 1047 (2013) (discussing duty and achievement orientation). Note that these
studies focused primarily on these individual factors as antecedents of voice, but in most
studies, voice could just as easily be the predictor. Individual traits have also been linked to
usage of voice mechanisms. See, e.g., Michael Frese et al., Helping to Improve Suggestion
Systems: Predictors of Making Suggestions in Companies, 20 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV.
1139, 1150 (1999) (focusing on self-efficacy and work-initiative predictors of suggestion
system usage); see also Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 179-80 (discussing
several studies).
101. Milliken et al., supra note 6.
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job consequences (such as getting passed over for promotions or being
fired).102 In the corporate hierarchical setting, leaders and supervisors and
the relationships they have with employees play particularly significant roles
in the risk assessment.103 This may be explained in part by the power
imbalances inherent in hierarchical structures. Because higher-ups have
power over subordinates’ pay, promotions, work assignments, and continued
employment, employees will be particularly wary of jeopardizing
relationships with them.104
Even if leaders display openness to input and willingness to address
concerns, employees may hold implicit, automatically-applied beliefs about
the riskiness of speaking up within a hierarchy.105 For example, employees
may subconsciously “intuit” that embarrassing one’s boss will result in
negative consequences.106 This may occur even if supervisors are objectively
approachable and open to input.107
The perceived riskiness of speaking up is heightened when voice is
critical; for example, when the thoughts or opinions at issue are critical of
“existing or impending practices, incidents, or behaviors that may harm their

102. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 179 (explaining that avoiding
negative consequences is a primary reason for avoiding expression of employee voice).
103. See, e.g., Karen Harlos, If You Build a Remedial Voice Mechanism, Will They Come?
Determinants of Voicing Interpersonal Mistreatment at Work, 63 HUM. REL, 311, 324 (2010)
(finding that relative hierarchical power is one of the key determinants in deciding whether
employees use formal voice mechanisms).
104. See, e.g., Isabel C. Botero & Linn Van Dyne, Employee Voice Behavior: Interactive
Effects of LMX and Power Distance in the United States and Colombia, 23 MGMT. COMMC’N
Q. 84, 98 (2009) (analyzing the positive relationship between leader-member exchange and
voice); James R. Detert & Ethan R. Burris, Leadership Behavior and Employee Voice: Is the
Door Really Open? 50 ACAD. MGMT. J. 869, 870 (2007) (investigating transformational
leadership and managerial openness); James R. Detert & Linda K. Trevino, Speaking Up to
Higher Ups: How Supervisor and Skip-Level Leaders Influence Employee Voice, 21 ORG. SCI.
249, 267 (2010) (noting that even the skip-level leaders may influence employees’ decisions
to exercise voice); Amy C. Edmondson, Speaking Up in the Operating Room: How Team
Leaders Promote Learning in Interdisciplinary Action Teams, 40 J. MGMT. STUDIES 1419,
1142-44 (2003) (looking at the effectiveness of team leader actions on voice in an
interdisciplinary context); Wu Liu et al., I Warn You Because I Like You: Voice Behavior,
Employee Identifications, and Transformational Leadership, 21 LEADERSHIP Q. 189, 191
(2010) (assessing the characteristics of voice behavior and whom employees are most likely
to speak out and speak up to); see also Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 180-82
(discussing the literature on the efficacy and safety of workplace voice).
105. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 183 (describing the learned origins
of implicit beliefs).
106. See id. (citing James R. Detert & Amy C. Edmondson, Implicit Voice Theories: Takenfor-Granted Rules of Self-Censorship at Work, 54 ACAD. MGMT. J. 461, 461 (2011) (detailing
the reluctance to voice concerns upward because of possible negative personal
consequences)).
107. Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 183.
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organization . . . ,”108 or when they relate to perceived mistreatment.109
Critical voice is riskier because “pointing out dysfunction more directly
implies the failure of important stakeholders in the workplace.”110 Ambitious
individuals may be particularly disinclined to voice a concern for fear that
doing so would jeopardize their career.111 This is troubling because critical
voice serves important diagnostic and preventative functions for
organizational health by drawing attention to previously undetected
problems and flaws in organizational initiatives.112 Liang and colleagues
suggest that in certain settings, critical voice may be even more impactful
than positive, “promotive” voice because developing and implementing new
initiatives is costly and time-consuming, particularly for fast-paced
organizations, whereas “prohibitive” voice may more efficiently place a
stopper on losses.113
b. Utility
Because of the risks involved in speaking up at work, employees are
unlikely to engage in voice if they perceive that doing so will be
ineffective.114 When group- or organization-level beliefs emphasize the
value of voice, individuals’ use of voice will be greater.115 An individual
108. Id.; Liang et al., supra note 46, at 72 (also comparing “promotive” voice to
“prohibitive” voice).
109. See generally Rusbult et al., supra note 26 (finding that informal voice behaviors
addressing perceived mistreatment are more likely when the employee has alternative
employment opportunities); see also Klaas et al, infra note 118, at 322.
110. Liang et al., supra note 46, at 85.
111. See generally Tangirala et al., supra note 100 (indicating, through an empirical study,
that duty orientation and employee voice are positively related, whereas achievement
orientation and employee voice are negatively related).
112. See Liang et al., supra note 46, at 75 (describing the important function of prohibitive
voice by putting undetected problems on the company’s radar).
113. Id.
114. Studies in the organizational justice realm demonstrate that while voice opportunity
has a positive impact on employee attitudes and behaviors, voice that is heard, but ignored,
has detrimental effects on employee attitudes and behaviors. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note
17, at 1534 (citing a study that found that heard but ignored voice resulted in a forty-one
percent decrease in output as compared to when voice was acted upon).
115. See Elizabeth W. Morrison et al., Speaking Up in Groups: A Cross-Level Study of
Group Voice Climate and Voice, 96 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 183, 188 (2011) (relating group-level
beliefs about the value of voice to individual use of informal voice); Desmond J. Leach et al.,
The Effectiveness of Idea Capture Schemes, 10 INT’L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 325, 341 (2006)
(finding that use of nonmonetary rewards and recognition may help validate participation in
formal mechanisms like suggestion systems); Cecilia Rapp & Jörgen Eklund, Sustainable
Development of a Suggestion System: Factors Influencing Improvement Activities in a
Confectionary Company, 17 HUM. FACTORS & ERGONOMICS IN MANUFACTURING & SERV.
INDUSTRIES 79 (2007) (finding that use of suggestion systems is positively related to publicity
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who perceives making constructive suggestions to be part of her prescribed
work role is also more likely to engage in voice.116 On the other hand,
employees are more likely to remain silent when there exists a shared grouplevel perception that speaking up is futile.117 Group-level attitudes toward
voice also impact the use of voice mechanisms such as suggestion systems.118
Employees are less willing to use suggestion systems when managers are
indifferent; they are more willing to do so when the organization possesses
a “learning culture.”119 “Research examining the use of formal grievance
process to address perceived mistreatment has shown that employees are
influenced by factors likely to affect the relative attractiveness of this form
of voice over other possible responses,”120 such as the availability of labor
market alternatives, and factors that are likely to increase the cost of
alternative responses.121
c. Managerial Attitudes
Employees’ fears and skepticism regarding higher-ups’ receptiveness
to subordinate input are not without basis. According to Morrison, a recent
series of studies suggest that when voice is seen as challenging the status quo
rather than supporting it, managers are more likely to regard the employee
as disloyal and threatening, and as a result, they are less likely to endorse the
message; further, they are more likely to rate employees who engage in
“prohibitive” voice as poor performers.122 Morrison and Milliken assert that
campaigns designed to highlight the need for employees to improve organizational processes
through the use of such mechanisms).
116. See Linn Van Dyne et al., In-Role Perceptions Buffer the Negative Impact of Low
LMX on Helping and Enhance the Positive Impact of High LMX on Voice, 93 J. APPL.
PSYCHOL. 1195, 1195 (2008) (finding that regarding voice as an in-role behavior amplifies
the effect of high-quality leader-member exchange relationships on voice).
117. Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 707 (detailing one of the reasons employees
do not speak up is belief that it will make no difference). This is supported by a study linking
upward, informal voice behaviors with perceptions regarding personal influence within the
work group. See Vijaya Venkataramani & Subrahmaniam Tangirala, When and Why Do
Central Employees Speak Up? An Examination of Mediating and Moderating Variables., 95
J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 582 (2010) (finding a positive relationship between work-flow centrality
and voice behavior, with personal influence moderating this relationship).
118. See Brian Klaas et al., The Determinants of Alternative Forms of Workplace Voice:
An Integrative Perspective, 38 J. MGMT. 314, 320 (2012) (detailing that in instances with
group-level beliefs that highly value voice, individual use of voice is greater).
119. See id. at 319 (stating suggestion system use is lower when there is a perception that
managers are indifferent to the suggestions and respond slowly).
120. Id. at 319-20.
121. Id. at 321.
122. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 188, (concluding that employers
are apt to label an employee that challenges them as “rebellious”).
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managers’ implicitly held beliefs and attitudes play a large part in shaping
organizational “climates of silence.”123 People (managers in this case) often
feel threatened by negative feedback and try to avoid receiving or absorbing
it by employing defensive mechanisms, such as questioning the credibility
of the source or dismissing the criticism as inaccurate.124 Managers may feel
a particularly strong need to avoid embarrassment, threat, and feelings of
vulnerability, even if they genuinely wish to be receptive to input.125
Negative feedback from subordinates is particularly unwelcome, and is
likely to be seen as less legitimate and more threatening compared to
feedback from above.126 Recent studies indicate that managers may perceive
employees who constantly express challenging voice as offensive, hostile, or
disloyal.127
Moreover, managers are likely to hold a number of implicit beliefs
about their subordinates and themselves that make them even more inclined
to discredit change-oriented input from employees.128 First, managers often
assume that employees are: (1) motivated by self-interest and (2) effortaverse and, therefore, will not, without motivation, seek the best interests of
the organization.129 Second, managers may believe “management knows
best,” and that “hired hands should put up or shut up.”130 Third, managers
often think that consensus is healthy and dissent is unhealthy.131 The
hierarchical structure of corporate organizations undergirds these beliefs; the
further people progress upward within an organization, the less likely they
are to identify with those below them.132
123. See Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 708 (explaining how the climate of silence
is created by fear of top management from receiving negative feedback from subordinates).
124. See id. (describing the ways managers try to deflect criticism).
125. Id.
126. See id. (detailing the intricacy of receiving feedback from subordinates).
127. Ethan R. Burris et al., Speaking Up Versus Being Heard: The Dimensions of
Disagreement Around and Outcomes of Employee Voice, 24 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI. 22, 25
(2013) (describing how managers see employees who complain excessively as deceitful or
hostile).
128. See Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 708 (reporting on the implicit beliefs on
managers).
129. See id. at 708-10 (explaining two of the implicit beliefs are that employees are (1)
self-interested and (2) effort averse).
130. W. Charles Redding, Rocking Boats, Blowing Whistles, and Teaching Speech
Communication, 34 COMM. ED. 245, 250 (1985). See also Michael J. Glauser, Upward
Information Flow in Organizations: Review and Conceptual Analysis., 37 HUM. REL. 613,
614 (1984) (“[P]ervasive management ideology implies that managers direct, control, and
reward, while subordinates accept responsibilities and follow through.”).
131. Morrison & Milliken, supra note 47, at 710 (viewing consensus as healthy and
discord as unhealthy).
132. See Seymour Lieberman, The Effects of Changes in Roles on the Attitudes of Role
Occupants, 9 HUM. REL. 385, 385 (1956) (describing how a person’s view will be impacted
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As a result, it is easy to show how voice that was intended to benefit the
organization may easily be misinterpreted as “unacceptably challenging
authority, rocking the boat, merely complaining and wasting time . . . or
showing off and not being a team player.”133
Next, this manuscript identifies ways in which the legal environment
may also stifle voice. To this end, Part II discusses typical employment
relationships in the United States followed in Part III with an analysis of
whistleblowing laws.
II.

THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: EMPLOYMENT-AT-WILL

In every U.S. state, private employment is presumed to be “at will.”134
Generally, unless an employment contract specifies otherwise, an employee
can be fired without cause. Likewise, an employee can leave a job for any
reason without being subject to liability.135 The lack of job security created
by the employment-at-will standard may serve as a systemic barrier to
exercising voice in and out of the workplace.
A. Historical Underpinnings of the Employment-at-Will Doctrine
The English common law rule and American practice in the nineteenth
century largely converged by enforcing employment contracts of a fixed
duration and disallowing premature termination without cause.136 The main
point of departure between the United States and English rules was the
treatment of employment contracts of indefinite length.
This English rule, construing a hiring of an indefinite length to be for a

by his role in the social system).
133. Detert et al., supra note 42, at 628.
134. See generally Charles J. Muhl, Monthly Labor Review: The Employment-at-will
Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, BUREAU LAB. STAT (2001),
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2001/01/art1full.pdf [https://perma.cc/9AKV-DA8M]. The
U.S. fits the stereotype of “American Exceptionalism” very well in this regard because it is
the only industrialized country in the world to be guided by employment-at-will. Ronald B.
Standler, History of At-Will Employment Law in the USA, (2000) (citing Daniel A.
Mathews, Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26
HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1447 n.54 (1975)), http://www.rbs2.com/atwill.htm
[https://perma.cc/H2NW-XUFB].
135. See Muhl, supra note 134, at 3 (defining at-will to mean that it is terminable by either
party for any reason).
136. See Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the
United States and England: An Historical Analysis, 5 COMP. LAB. L. 85, 102-03 (1982)
(stating how in the nineteenth century American courts followed the example of English
common law for enforcing contracts of fixed duration).
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year,137 was thought to protect servants (and the communities, who under
English poor laws, were responsible for maintaining their poor) from being
discharged during the lulls of the planting and harvesting season while also
protecting masters from servants leaving during the busy periods.138
Under the traditional view of the history of at-will employment in the
United States, the states followed the substance of the English rule139 before
a seismic shift in the late-nineteenth century following the publication of the
influential legal treatise, Horace G. Wood’s Master and Servant. After this
shift, employment without a set duration was prima-facie terminable at the
will of either party.140
While some scholars doubt the importance of Wood’s treatise,141 the
United States Supreme Court emphatically adopted the at-will rule in
1908. In Adair v. United States,142 the Court reviewed the constitutionality
of Section 10 of the Act of Congress of June 1, 1898. Section 10, which
protected an employee’s ability to join unions,143 was struck down on the
grounds that it interfered with an employer’s personal liberty and right of
property under the Fifth Amendment.144 Seven years later, the Supreme
Court struck down a similar state statute under the 14th Amendment,
explaining that the statute interferes with the right to contract, a protected
property right.145
137. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *413.
138. See Feinman, supra note 7, at 120 (detailing the history of the principle and giving
an example with planting and harvest seasons).
139. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 67 (2000).
140. See, e.g., Payne v. W. & A.R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884) (ruling that
termination at will not give rise to a legal wrong).
141. Some scholars present evidence that Wood’s rule was not immediately accepted by
all the states. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 139, at 67 (referencing a New York Court of
Appeals case that did not immediately accept Wood’s rule). Other scholars doubt the
influence of Wood’s treatise in precipitating the adoption of the employment-at-will doctrine.
Furthermore, historians have evidence that a number of states were not applying the English
annual hiring rule long before Wood’s treatise. As early as 1853, Georgia was not applying
the English rule. See Henderson v. Stiles, 14 Ga. 135 (1853) (commenting that where an
employment contract has no specified time, an employee may recover unpaid labor wages on
a theory of quantum meruit; the annual hiring presumption of the English rule is not
mentioned). Even after Wood’s treatise, only one-third of states cited Wood for their adoption
of their respective at-will rules between 1880 and 1900. Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding
Myths: An Empirical and Economic Reassessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 MO.
L. REV. 679, 697 (1994).
142. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
143. Section 10 of the Act of Congress of June 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 424, ch. 370.
144. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. at 176.
145. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 13 (1915). These cases fall in line with the other
cases striking down interference with the right to contract under substantive due process
during the so-called Lochner-era. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (holding
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Beginning in the mid-1930’s, the original version of the at-will rule met
its demise. Exceptions to the doctrine began to rise precipitated by the
passage and subsequent judicial interpretation of the National Labor
Relations Act, which gave employees the right to self-organize and join labor
unions.146 Today, the high courts of forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia recognize some modern variant of the at-will employment rule.147
B. Application of Employment-at-Will Today
Despite “at-will” having the connotation of “for any reason,” modern
American law acknowledges that even at-will employees cannot be fired for
literally any reason. The at-will presumption is just that—a presumption.
Laws and contracts may alter the presumption and legal rules may limit its
application. Two broad categories of exceptions to the at-will doctrine exist:
those based on statutes and those based on common law. These categories
are discussed next.

that a statute establishing maximum hours for bakers was unconstitutional under the “general
right to make contract in relation to [one’s] business [which is] part of the liberty of the
individual protected by the [Fourteenth] Amendment. . . .”). The influence of laissez-faire
economics evident in the Lochner-era, is often put forth as a reason for the abandonment of
the English rule. See Jacoby, supra note 136, at 92-93 (indicating the impact laissez-faire
theories impacted court’s rulings). Additionally, the rise of the at-will rule coincides well
with industrialization, so some legal historians posit a causal relationship. These historians
reason that the more familial master-servant relationship increasingly became replaced by
impersonal, commercial employment relationships, where employers no longer were expected
to take on the responsibility of ensuring their employee’s job security. See, e.g., Feinman,
supra note 7, at 123 (comparing the original conception of the master-servant relationship as
a domestic relationship with the later attitude that the master-servant relationship was a
commercial one). There are challengers to this belief though. See, e.g., Morriss, supra note
141, at 703 (finding that the rule spread from the West and South to East and did not cover a
majority of the population until the mid-1890’s, well after many of the significant labor
struggles stemming from capital and labor had taken place); id. at 682, 697, 745 (finding that
the rise of the at-will rule is best correlated with the rise of elected judges; thus, the scholar
hypothesized that the reason behind adoption of the rule must lie with the court as an
institution, perhaps judicial desire for a simple rule or to keep decisions from going to a jury).
See also Feinman, supra note 7, at 131-34 (claiming the rule was promoted by the
“capitalists,” who were combatting legal challenges by an emerging professional class and
wanted to shift the risk of economic downturns to employees by being able to discharge them
during downturns).
146. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding that an
employer cannot use the right to discharge employees to “intimidate or coerce its employees
with respect to their self-organization and representation. . . .”).
147. Restatement of Empl. L. § 2.01 (“Montana is the only U.S. state to have enacted a
statute requiring a showing of “good cause. . . .”).
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1. Statutory Exceptions to Employment-at-Will
Numerous federal statutes limit an employer’s ability to freely
discharge an employee. Some of these statutes relate to the exercise of
employee rights: For example, an employer cannot discharge or take other
adverse actions based on an employee’s exercise of protected concerted
activities,148 refusal to take part in activities that are reasonably believed to
be in violation of any law,149 exercise of rights related to wage-and-hour
standards,150 exercise of rights secured by the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act,151 or request for leave under the Family and Medical Leave
Act.152 Other statutes deal with discharge related to certain characteristics of
an individual employee. Employers are prohibited from discharging an
employee on the basis of race, sex, color, religion, national origin,153 age,154
pregnancy,155 or disability.156 Federal statutes also protect employees that
report, or assist in investigations of, employers’ violations of federal acts
such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,157 wage violations,158 health and safety
violations,159 or violations under the Clean Air Act160 and Water Pollution
Control Act.161 States also have their own statutes that limit at-will
employment.162
Finally, a number of states have enacted statutes protecting employees
from discharge based on lawful activity outside of the workplace.163 For
148. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-169 (1947).
149. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1985).
150. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (2016).
151. Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1151 (1974).
152. Family Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2614 (2008).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
154. Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (1985), amended by
P.L. 104-208 §119 (1997).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1964).
156. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990), amended by P.L
110-325 (2008).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2010).
158. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2016).
159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (1985).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1977).
161. 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1948).
162. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (1975) (barring termination as the result of an
employee bringing an action against their employer to recover workers’ compensation
benefits or filing notice of violation of a safety rule); MD. CODE ANN., LAB & EMPL. § 9-1105
(West 1991) (barring termination as the result of an employee bringing an action against their
employer to recover workers’ compensation benefits or filing notice of violation of a safety
rule); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1640 (1979) (barring employee discharge or negative action due
to jury duty).
163. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (Deering 1999) (permitting claims for loss of
wages from demotion, suspension, or discharge for non-working hour lawful conduct away
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example, Connecticut protects employees who exercise certain federal and
state constitutional rights provided the “activity does not substantially or
materially interfere with the employee’s bona fide job performance or the
working relationship between the employee and the employer.”164 New York
goes beyond this and protects employees who engage in legal “recreational
activities,” including legal use of consumable products, provided the
activities are outside work hours, off of the employer’s property, and do not
involve the employer’s equipment or property.165 Most state statutes
protecting employees for lawful activity outside of work contain exceptions
for activity related to work or to the employer’s business interests.166
2. Common Law Exceptions to Employment-at-Will
Much more complicated than the statutory exceptions to the at-will
presumptiondsf are the common law exceptions. These judicially-created
exceptiofadsns can be generally classified into three categories; those based
on (a) implied contract, (b) the covenant of good faith, and (c) public policy.
a. Implied-in-Contract Exception
The implied-in-contract exception establishes a breach of contract
from employer’s property); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2007) (permitting claims for
loss of wages from demotion, suspension, or discharge for non-working hour lawful conduct
away from employer’s property); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1983) (prohibiting
discipline or discharge based on an employee’s exercise of rights guaranteed by first
amendment, so long as such activity does not materially interfere with the employee’s job
performance); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 1993) (outlawing certain employment
actions in relation to various legal activities outside employment duties); N.D. CENT. CODE
ANN. § 14-02.4-03 (West 2015) (outlawing certain employment actions in relation to various
legal activities outside employment duties); see also Aaron Kirkland, “You Got Fired? On
Your Day Off?!”: Challenging Termination of Employees for Personal Blogging Practices,
75 UMKC L. REV. 545, 546 (2006) (“[S]ix states have enacted exceptions to the at-will
presumption, making it more difficult for an employer to terminate an employee for off-duty
conduct.”).
164. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 1983); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin,
It’s My Life – Leave Me Alone: Off-the-Job Employee Associational Privacy Rights, 35 AM.
BUS. L.J. 47 (1997) (describing Ford Motor Company’s “sociological department,” which
monitored employees to make sure they led clean lives).
165. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2) (McKinney 1993).
166. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2007) (protecting lawful activity off an
employer’s premises during nonworking hours unless it “[r]elates to a bona fide occupational
requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the employment activities and
responsibilities of a particular employee . . .”); see also N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-03
(West 2015) (protecting “lawful activity off the employer’s premises during nonworking
hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests of the
employer.”).
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where an employer fires an employee when the circumstances surrounding
the employment relationship dictate that the employee was not terminable
at-will. This exception is commonly applied in cases involving written
employer policies, such as employment manuals, which can contain
provisions that limit the employer’s power to discharge an employee.167
Even without express provisions, certain provisions can amount to an
implied contract that limits the at-will doctrine.168 For example, in Toussaint
v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,169 the Michigan Supreme Court
ruled that the employer’s employee manual and guidelines, which specified
that employees would only be terminated for just-cause, created an implied
contract overcoming the at-will presumption.170 Some states have gone as
far as to imply that an employer’s creation of an atmosphere of job security
is sufficient to overcome the at-will employment presumption.171
Furthermore, oral assurances of job security may also be sufficient to
overcome the presumption of employment-at-will.172 Only thirteen states do
167. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Koelsch, 124 Wis. 2d 154 (2003) (holding that an employee
handbook may convert an employment at will relationship into one only terminable by the
terms of the handbook).
168. See, e.g., Cisco v. King, 205 S.W. 3d 808, 810 (Ark. App. 2005) (finding that
employees terminated without cause are entitled to damages where their employment manual
stated that “the tenure of an employee with permanent status shall continue during good
behavior and satisfactory performance . . .”); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d
622, 626-628 (Minn. 1983) (holding that the general language regarding high job security of
the “Job Security” section of an employee handbook was “no more than a general statement
of policy” but the “Disciplinary Policy” was an offer creating an implied contract overcoming
the at-will presumption because it set out in definite language an offer of a unilateral contract
for procedures to be followed in job termination); Aberle v. City of Aberdeen, 718 N.W.2d
615, 621 (S.D. 2006) (stating that a policy or handbook providing exclusive grounds for
employee discipline or discharge amounts to an implied contract binding the employer to a
for-cause termination procedure when the language is not merely precatory or explicitly
disclaims any deviation from at-will employment).
169. See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 613-15 (1980) (stating
that an employee’s reliance on a provision in the employee manual stating that discharge
would be for just cause only established an implied contract rebutting the at-will
presumption).
170. Id. at 614.
171. See, e.g., Bulman v. Safeway, Inc., 27 P.3d 1172, 1175 (Wash. 2001) (“[I]f an
employer, for whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment with
promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to
remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those promises are enforceable
components of the employment relationship.” (citing Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102
Wn.2d 219, 230 (Wash. 1984))).
172. See, e.g., Murphy v. Grower Serv. Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61006, at *8 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 17, 2006) (“In order for oral statements of job security to overcome the
presumption of employment at-will, they must be clear and unequivocal.” (citing Rowe v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 437 Mich. 627, 473 N.W.2d 268, 275 (Mich. 1991))); Ehrhardt v.
Electr. & Instrumentation Unlimited, 220 F.Supp.2d 649, 655 (E.D. Tex. 2002) (“For an oral
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not recognize the implied-contract exception.173 Employers today often
carefully word their handbooks and other materials given to employees and
typically include disclaimers, thus largely avoiding claims of this kind.
b. Implied Covenant of Good-Faith and Fair-Dealing
Under the good-faith and fair-dealing exception, a court will read the
implied covenant of good-faith and fair-dealing into every employment
relationship.174 This exception has been interpreted to mean either: (1) that
terminations motivated by malice or made in bad faith are prohibited, or (2)
that employer personnel decisions are subject to a just-cause standard.175
California courts were among the first to recognize the good-faith
exception.176 In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,177 the California appellate
court acknowledged a terminated employee’s eighteen years of service for
the employer airline company in holding that the employee could only be
fired for good cause.178 The court stated that the employee’s termination
after such a long period of employment offended the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.179 Interestingly, the court noted the importance
of reading in the implied duty in order to “ensure social stability in our
society.”180 Delaware courts applied the covenant of good-faith and fairdealing in an at-will employment situation with regard to an employer’s “bad
faith or unfair dealing achieved by deceit or misrepresentation . . . to create

contract to exist, ‘the employer must unequivocally indicate a definite intent to be bound not
to terminate the employee except under clearly specified circumstances.’” (citing
Montgomery County Hosp. Dist. v. Brown, 965 S.W.2d 501, 502 (Tex. 1998))); Schipani v.
Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606, 612-25 (1981) (denying a motion to dismiss on a breach
of contract claim because, even though plaintiff had signed an agreement noting his
employment was at-will, later assurances were deemed to possibly amount to an implied
contract); Troy v. Rutgers, 774 A.2d 476, 482 (N.J. 2001) (“Oral promises . . . have been held
to give rise to an enforceable obligation on the part of an employer.”).
173. Muhl, supra note 134, at 4 (listing Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Texas, and
Virginia as states not recognizing the implied-contract exception); see also, Parker v. United
Airlines, Inc., 32 Wash. App. 722, 725-26 (1982) (stating that an employee’s subjective
understanding or expectations alone are not sufficient grounds to create an implied contract
that overcomes the at-will presumption).
174. Muhl, supra note 134, at 10.
175. See id. (citing Shane and Rosenthal, EMPLOYMENT LAW DESKBOOK, § 16.03[8]
(1999)).
176. Id. at 10.
177. 111 Cal. App. 3d 443 (1980).
178. Id. at 455-56.
179. Id. at 455.
180. Id.
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fictitious grounds to terminate employment.”181 The covenant was first
recognized in Idaho where an employer dropped an employee to part-time
for using above-average sick-leave days although the employee had not used
all her accrued sick leave.182
The vast majority of states reject the good-faith and fair-dealing
exception to at-will employment.183 According to a Florida court in Catania
v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,184 inquiring into an employer’s motivation behind
the termination of an employee is too great of a task for the court to
undertake.185 Several other courts have elaborated that acknowledging a
good-faith exception to the at-will presumption would essentially transform
the presumption to one of for-cause.186 The only states to recognize the goodfaith exception are Alabama,187 Alaska,188 Arizona,189 California,190

181. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 443-44 (Del. 1996)
(holding that if a jury believed that an employer mounted a false campaign to discredit an atwill employee who criticized him, such campaign resulting in the employee being fired, the
termination would amount to being in bad faith).
182. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744, 749 (Idaho 1989) (“[A]ny action by
either party which violates, nullifies or significantly impairs any benefit of the employment
contract is a violation of the implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing which we
adopt today.”).
183. See Muhl, supra note 134, at 4 (listing the only states to recognize the good-faith
exception as: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming); see, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F.
Supp. 2d 623, 643 (E.D. Pa. 2001), aff’d in part, vacated in part, remanded, 352 F.3d 107 (3d
Cir. 2003), as amended, (Jan. 20, 2004) (noting that Pennsylvania does not recognize the good
faith and fair dealing exception to the at-will employment doctrine); O’Reilly v. Physicians
Mut. Ins. Co., 992 P.2d 644, 649 (Colo. App. 1999) (declining to reconsider the dismissal of
a claim for breach of implied duty of good faith and fair dealing); Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790
N.E.2d 753, 755-56 (N.Y. 2003) (recognizing the good faith and fair dealing exception only
where it is consistent with agreed upon contract terms); Fitzgerald v. Salsbury Chem., Inc.,
613 N.W.2d 275, 281 (Iowa 2000) (recounting the erosion of the at-will employment
doctrine); City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 216 (Tex. 2000) (declining to impose
a duty of good faith and fair dealing in police employment case).
184. 381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
185. Id. at 267.
186. See, e.g., Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 324 (Ct. App. 1980)
(recognizing that reading in a good-faith exception would transform an at-will contract “into
a hybrid contract under which the employee cannot be discharged unless his work is
unsatisfactory or his services are no longer needed.”).
187. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725, 738 (Ala. 1987).
188. Becker v. Fred Meyer Stores, Inc., 355 P.3d 1110, 1116-17 (Alaska 2014).
189. Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem’l Hosp., 147 Ariz. 370, 383 (1985).
190. Foley v. U.S. Paving Co., 262 Cal. App. 2d 499, 505 (Ct. App. 1968).
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Delaware,191 Idaho,192 Massachusetts,193 Montana,194 Nevada,195 Utah196 and
Wyoming.197
c.

The Public Policy Exception

Based on common law tort theories, the public policy exception is the
most prevalent exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.198 This
exception protects employees from termination that would be contrary to
federal or state public policy.199
Many states expand this doctrine beyond wrongful discharge to also
cover wrongful demotion or other significant job-related detriment in
contravention of public policy.200 For example, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Connecticut found that a teacher, who was also the teachers’
union president, was protected from an unpaid suspension following the
teacher being “quoted in a newspaper article criticizing the school district’s
reimbursement of administrators’ advanced degrees.”201 The public policy
exception has yet to be extended to a wrongful refusal to hire.202
191. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440-44 (Del. 1996).
192. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 116 Idaho 622, 626-28 (1989).
193. Gram v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 384 Mass. 659, 672 (1981).
194. Gates v. Life of Mont. Ins. Co., 196 Mont. 178, 184-85 (1982).
195. K Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (1987).
196. Berube v. Fashion Ctr., 771 P.2d 1033, 1046-47 (Utah 1989).
197. Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Com., 868 P.2d 211, 220 (Wyo. 1994).
198. Labor and Employment Law, Ch. 259, § 259.05 (Matthew Bender); Mark A.
Fahleson, The Public Policy Exception to Employment at Will-When Should Courts Defer to
the Legislature, 72 NEB. L. REV. 956, 958 (1993) (citing Frank J. Cavico, Employment at Will
and Public Policy, 25 AKRON L. REV. 497, 497 (1992)); Brad Seligman, At-Will Termination:
Evaluating Wrongful Discharge Actions, TRIAL, Feb. 1983, at 60, 61); Muhl, supra note 134,
at 4.
199. See, e.g., Cummins v. Mold-In Graphic Sys., 2001 Ariz. App. Unpub. LEXIS 2
(2001), rev. denied, 38 P.3d 12 (Ariz. 2002) (explaining that Arizona public policy can be
found in federal laws); see also Silo v. CHW Med. Found., 45 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Cal. 2002)
(relying, in part, upon the federal Constitution to determine public policy). But see Radicke
v. Fenton, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2362 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2001) (explaining that Pennsylvania
law does not recognize federal statutes or regulations as statements of public policy).
200. See, e.g., Glover v. NMC Homecare, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1151 (D. Kan. 2000)
(recognizing that the tort of retaliatory discharge as a public policy exception to the at-willemployment doctrine extends to retaliatory demotion), aff’d, 13 Fed. Appx. 896 (10th Cir.
2001); see also Trosper v. Bag ‘N Save, 734 N.W.2d 704, 706 (2007) (extending the public
policy exception to demotion in addition to discharge).
201. Valenti v. Torrington Bd. of Educ., 601 F. Supp. 2d 427, 432 (D. Conn. 2009).
202. See, e.g., Berrington v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 696 F.3d 604, 609 (6th Cir. 2012) (“An
employee’s right to be hired or rehired . . . has never been recognized as actionable, under
common law on public policy grounds.”); Fontaine v. Clermont Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 633 F.
Supp. 2d 530, 540 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (“[T]here is no cause of action under Ohio law for
retaliation or for wrongful failure to hire in violation of public policy.”).

SCHIPANI_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICES

11/30/2017 2:53 PM

1007

Some state courts, including Alabama, Georgia, and New York, heavily
disfavor or decline to create public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine
and rather leave the creation of such exceptions to the state legislatures.203
Other jurisdictions recognize a judicially created public policy exception but
limit it.204 Yet other state judiciaries apply the public policy exception
comparatively broadly. Utah’s Supreme Court applied this exception to atwill employees of Wal-Mart who were discharged for exercising their right
to self-defense when a confrontation with shoplifters became physical,
despite Wal-Mart’s policy requiring employees to withdraw from potentially
violent situations.205 The Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly allowed a
claim of wrongful discharge violating claim against public policy when an
employee, who was also a municipal council member, voted for an ordinance
that was against the employer’s interest and was subsequently discharged.206
The exceptions to the employment at-will doctrine provide important
opportunities for employees to be able to find their voice in organizations.
In many ways though, the common law exceptions have been supplanted by
a new crop of legislative attempts to encourage whistleblowing. The next
part, Part III, discusses the need to provide voice for whistleblowers, the
legislative initiatives to accomplish this, and recent efforts by others to stifle
the voice of whistleblowers.
III.

WHISTLEBLOWING

A. Efforts to Promote Whistleblowing
The widespread adoption of whistleblowing legislation and popular
acceptance of the idea today is a result of a long history of legislators’ desires
to get employees to speak up to stop fraud and wrongdoing within
organizations and government, to facilitate law enforcement, and to protect
public health and safety.207 The first legislative enactments coincided with
203. Horn v. N.Y. Times, 790 N.E.2d 753, 759 (N.Y. 2003) (“We have consistently
declined to create a common-law tort of wrongful or abusive discharge . . . grounded in a
conception of public policy into employment contracts . . . .”); Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 528 S.E.2d 238, 239-40 (2000) (“Although there can be public policy exceptions to the
doctrine, judicially created exceptions are not favored, and Georgia courts thus generally defer
to the legislature to create them.”); Howard v. Wolff Broad. Corp., 611 So. 2d 307, 312 (1992)
(affirming that the court, thus far, declines to recognize public policy exceptions to at-will
employment and leaves the creation of such exceptions to the legislature).
204. See, e.g., Winters v. Houston Chronicle Pub. Co., 781 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Tex. App.
1989) (finding that the “narrow” public policy exception was held not to apply to an employee
reporting illegal act but only to employees who refuse to perform an illegal act).
205. Ray v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 359 P.3d 614, 617, 636 (2015).
206. MacDougall v. Weichert, 677 A.2d 162, 167 (1996).
207. See Norman D. Bishara et al., The Mouth of Truth, 10 NYU J.L. & BUS. 37, 39 (2013)
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the beginning of the court-created exceptions to employment at-will that are
discussed above.208 These statutes, passed after some calamity, banned
retaliation. The presumption was that people within the organization who
knew about problems were afraid of the consequences of coming forward; if
employees were statutorily protected against retaliation, they would be more
willing to speak out.209 However, whistleblowers did not initially rely on the
statutes because they provided no meaningful remedies. Thus, those who
had lost jobs or suffered other detriment opted to sue under the common law
theories, especially wrongful firing in violation of public policy, which
allowed for punitive damages.210 Further, the initial presumption may be
wrong; as noted earlier in this article, social science studies report that factors
other than fear of retaliation are important in deciding whether to report.211
Some of these factors include the perceived need for strong evidence, the
seriousness of the wrongdoing, the perceived likelihood that managers
would listen and that the problem would be corrected, clear reporting
channels, and an organizational atmosphere of openness that encourages
voice.212
Statutory protection for whistleblowers rapidly grew in the late 1980’s
and 1990’s, especially after legislators saw the efficacy of giving large
rewards for information that could help governments recover wrongfullyclaimed funds, conserve law enforcement resources, and stop wrongdoing
earlier.213 A key occurrence spurring the widespread adoption of
whistleblowing legislation was the revision of the False Claims Act (FCA)
in 1986.214 The revised FCA allows a whistleblower to bring suit in the name
(describing why legislators encourage whistleblowing).
208. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State of State
Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 105-06 (2000) [hereinafter The State of State
Whistleblowers] (determining that whistleblower protection statutes appeared at the same
time as the erosion of the employment at-will doctrine).
209. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Janet P. Near, Whistleblowing Statutes: Are They
Working?, 25 AM. BUS. L.J. 241 (1987) (describing the impact of changes in the law on
whistleblowing and concluding that statutes meant to encourage whistleblowing do not have
their intended effect).
210. Id. at 241-47.
211. See Marcia Parmerlee Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Relationship Among Beliefs,
Organizational Position, and Whistle-Blowing Status: A Discriminant Analysis, 27 ACAD. OF
MGMT. J. 687, 701 (1984) (profiling both whistleblowers and non-whistleblowers and
concluding that non-whistleblowers generally do not believe that speaking up is worth risking
their careers and do not trust whistleblower protections).
212. Marcia A. Parmerlee et al., Correlates of Whistle-Blowers’ Perceptions of
Organizational Retaliation, 27 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 17, 27-31 (1982).
213. Bishara et al., supra note 207, at 39. Another possible advantage is self-monitoring
if people are aware they may be reported for wrongdoing. Id. at 39-40.
214. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2012) (defining liability for false claims acts). The Act
was originally enacted in 1863 in response to contractors cheating the government during the

SCHIPANI_FINAL_EIC ADJ (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

IMPACT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW AND PRACTICES

11/30/2017 2:53 PM

1009

of the government to recover wrongfully claimed federal funds, even if the
government itself does not bring suit. If the information provided is new
(unknown to the government) and leads to a recovery, the whistleblower can
receive up to 30% of what is collected by the government.215 Since such
fraud usually involves large sums of money,216 many successful
whistleblowers become millionaires.217 Whistleblowing suits under the FCA
increased from an average of six per year pre-amendments,218 to over 450 in
1998, and to thousands now.219 Indeed, a recent five-week period was
declared to be a record period for FCA whistleblower recoveries, resulting
in about $500 million recovered by the government.220 In fraud involving
Medicare alone, the government has recovered $5.5 billion from 2007 to
2016.221 While the increase in reward size clearly was important in
generating reports, in part because it helps balance out the risks of
whistleblowing,222 other changes also contributed to the success. These
Civil War. By the 1980s, it had fallen into disuse. See Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and
Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. J. 1757, 1769 (2007) [hereinafter SOX and Whistleblowing]
(detailing the history of the FCA).
215. 31 U.S.C. §3730 (d)(1)-(2) (2010).
216. The fraud was estimated to be around $100 billion per year or more in the last decade.
Fines are assessed and recovery amounts can be triple, which leads to the large awards.
Originally, the suits tended to involve defense contracting. Now, the focus has shifted to
Medicare and other health fraud. Most cases end in settlements. SOX and Whistleblowing,
supra note 214, at 1769.
217. See The State of State Whistleblowers, supra note 208, at 101 (noting that the FCA
has made millionaires of most of the successful whistleblowers); Qui Tam Statistics, 12 FCA
& QUI TAM Q. REV. 41 (1998) (demonstrating that the whistleblower award has increased
since 1998); Fraud Statistics – Overview, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 23, 2013), https://www
.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2013/12/26/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Statistics.pdf
[https://perma.cc/37CV-AX3G] [hereinafter Fraud Statistics] (analyzing settlements,
judgments, and relator share awards from 1987 to 2013).
218. Steve France, The Private War on Pentagon Fraud, 76 A.B.A. J. 46, 48 (1990).
219. Fraud Statistics – Overview, supra note 217, at 1.
220. Record Period for Whistleblower Recoveries, CONSTANTINE CANNON (Aug. 8, 2016),
http://constantinecannon.com/whistleblower/record-period-whistleblowerrecoveries#V7soPdKANBc [https://perma.cc/KX78-SV62] [hereinafter Record Period]
(stating there were twenty-three recoveries from June 27, 2016 to August 1, 2016, involving
a variety of false claims of multiple medical-related issues, financial fraud, government
contracting, grant, and customs fraud; and that most FCA recoveries involve settlements).
221. See The Editorial Board, Fraud and Other Threats to Medicare, N.Y. TIMES (July 28,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/28/opinion/fraud-and-other-threats-to-medicare.ht
ml? _r=0 [https:// perma.cc/72TB-DJZD] (stating that, in its nine-year history, the Medicare
Fraud Strike Force, an alliance for combined action among local, state and federal agencies,
has garnered information resulting in over 2,000 convictions, mostly resulting in prison terms;
arguing also that stopping fraud results in better care because medical fraud frequently
includes obtaining tests that are not needed).
222. A study by the University of Chicago and Toronto University reported that in
industries covered by the FCA, employees were substantially more likely to report major
frauds than those in areas not covered. See Alexander Dyke et al., Who Blows the Whistle on
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include increased certainty that an award would be made, the extension of
the statute of limitations, guaranteed participation in the process, and the
development of a well-developed bar specializing in FCA claims.223
The success of the FCA in recovering government funds has resulted in
a proliferation of reward legislation at both the federal and state levels.
However, for a variety of reasons, these state and federal laws have not been
as successful as the FCA.224 Crises caused by financial and corporate wrong
doing led to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002225 and the DoddFrank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act in 2010.226 Both
laws provide important protections and significant financial reward
incentives for whistleblowers.227 These statutes have also been successful in
generating reports and recoveries.228 The passage of the Deficit Reduction
Act of 2005, designed to combat Medicaid Fraud, gave states an additional
financial incentive to pass FCA-type legislation, and many more have done
so.229 Success under the FCA also led the Internal Revenue Service to revise
its reward program in order to help recover unreported or underreported
taxes.230 The revisions again have led to huge increases in reports and some
Corporate Fraud, 65 J. FIN. 2213, 2215 (2010).
223. See Elleta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do Good and Get Rich:
Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 273, 27883 (1992) [hereinafter Get Rich] (detailing how various statutes have created important
financial incentives to encourage whistleblowing).
224. See SOX and Whistleblowing, supra note 214, at 1764–73 (describing the inadequacy
of various whistleblower protections); Bishara et al, supra note 207, at 56 (noting that the
success of whistleblower protections has been met with resistance due to the complicated
nature of the claims, judicial decisions, and statutory features).
225. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. II 2002).
226. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922, 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010).
227. See Whistleblower Awards Top $100 Million, SEC,
https://www.sec.gov/page/whistleblower-100million [https://perma.cc/438V-GMLT] (last
visited Oct. 10, 2016) (pointing out that the SEC has paid over $100 million to
whistleblowers from 2013 to 2016, with the largest award being $30 million).
228. See Bishara, et al., supra note 207, at 49-50 (discussing that some states even allow
the whistleblower to collect more than the 30% allowed under the FCA); Cal. Gov. Code §
12652(g) (2012) (allowing for a collection of up to 50% of the amount recovered by the
government).
229. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396b (2006) (requiring State governments to carry some of the
burden of Medicaid costs and incentivizing them to pass FCA-type legislation) (current
version at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396(b) (2015)).
230. Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-432, § 406(a)(1), 120 Stat.
2922, 2958-59 (2006). The amount of the “tax gap” was estimated to be $385 million in 2014.
See Denise M. Farag & Terry Morehead Dworkin, A Taxing Process: Whistleblowing Under
the I.R.S. Reward Program, 26 S. L.J. 19, 20 (2016) (discussing that the amount of the “tax
gap” was estimated to be $385 million in 2014); id. at 43-44 (explaining that the recoveries
under the IRS program have taken a long time between the report and the recovery).
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significant recoveries. In August 2016, two whistleblowers recovered $17.8
million for reporting on a Swiss bank that helped U.S. taxpayers hide money
from the IRS.231 The case is important in another regard: The U.S. Tax
Court, for the first time, allowed the award to include part of the criminal
fines and civil forfeitures collected from the bank.232 States have also
observed the success of rewards, and in times of financial need have passed
FCA-type laws.233
Whistleblowing legislation covering a wide variety of areas exists
outside the reward structure. Today, all states have some form of
whistleblower statutory protection and many states have several statutes.234
Numerous measures have also been enacted on the federal level.235
Additionally, courts have extended whistleblower protection under statutes
not specifically passed to protect whistleblowers,236 and federal employees
are protected under the Civil Service Reform Act and its numerous
revisions.237 Despite all the legislation, there is no general whistleblower
protection, and employees can “fall through the cracks” and not be protected.
Thus, new whistleblower legislation and protections are being proposed and
passed.238

231. Record Period, supra note 220, at 1.
232. Id.
233. See, e.g., Indiana False Claims and Whistleblower Protection Act, IND. CODE § 5-115.5 (West Supp. 2007) (defining the necessary elements for false claims and whistleblower
protection); Michigan Medicaid False Claim Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 400.601-400.615
(1977) (describing remedies and penalties for fraudulent acts).
234. See The State of State Whistleblowers, supra note 208, 132-175 (listing each state’s
whistleblower protection laws).
235. See Bishara et al., supra note 207, at 40-41 (providing examples of the steps
legislators have taken to promote protection).
236. The State of State Whistleblowers, supra note 208, at 103-04.
237. See SOX and Whistleblowing, supra note 214, at 1766-67 (detailing the history and
objective of the Civil Service Reform Act and the Office of Special Counsel). Protection for
federal employees has proved to be particularly problematic. Government employees also
have some protections under the Constitution. See also Pickering v. Bd. Of Educ., 391 U.S.
563, 574 (1968) (holding that a teacher’s right to speak with respect to issues of public
importance cannot be grounds for dismissal).
238. See, e.g., CFTC Proposed Regulations Will Protect Whistleblowers and Prohibit Gag
Clauses, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 31, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/cftcproposed-regulations-will-protect-whistleblowers-and-prohibit-gag-clauses
[https://perma.cc/6BSW-RKZE] (writing about proposed regulations, such as §165.19(b),
which would disallow the use of confidentiality and pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
employment agreements); A.G. Schneiderman Proposes Bill to Reward and Protect
Whistleblowers Who Report Financial Crimes, N.Y. ST. OFF. OF ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 26, 2015),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-proposes-bill-reward-and-protectwhistleblowers-who-report-financial [https://perma.cc/C9E7-GL8E] (describing a new
proposal by AG Eric Schneiderman, which would benefit employees who report illegal
activity in various industries).
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B. Efforts to Silence Whistleblowing and Voice
While legislators,239 scholars, and others have recognized the
importance of employee voice and whistleblowing, business has been
reluctant to embrace it, despite the fact that intra-organizational disclosures
can benefit the organization.240 The problems at Volkswagen are but one
current example of failed reporting in the workplace.241 Not only do
businesses not embrace whistleblowing, they often work against it. With
their outsized power in contrast to individuals or consumer groups, they are
succeeding in getting anti-whistleblowing legislation enacted. Businesses
also put up barriers to voice within the organization. Three examples
illustrate these efforts: “ag-gag” laws, non-disclosure agreements,242 and
unrealistic performance pressure on employees, exemplified by recent
disclosures at Wells Fargo.
1. Ag-Gag Laws
Perhaps the most active legislative efforts to stifle disclosure involve
the food production industry. Legislators in several states have enacted “aggag” laws—laws that prevent employees and other people from using
undercover tactics to expose cruelty to animals and pollution caused by mega

239. Senators have proposed that July 30 be designated as Whistleblower Appreciation
Day because “Congress has an obligation to stand up for individuals who risk their jobs and
reputations to shine a light on threats to public safety.” Rudy Takala, Senators Propose
‘Whistleblower Appreciation Day’, WASH. EXAMINER, June 30, 2016,
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/senators-propose-whistleblower-appreciationday/article/2595398 [https://perma.cc/XGA2-L3CQ].
240. Bishara et al, supra note 207, at 40. Internal whistleblowing can be an efficient and
inexpensive source of information about organizational mistakes and can stop problems
quicker than if the information has to go outside the organization. It can also help protect the
reputation of the organization. See id.
241. See William Boston, Volkswagen’s Legal Battles Heat Up Around the Globe, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 24, 2016, at B1 (describing Volkswagen’s emissions-cheating scandal); Nick
Kostov, Tougher French Probe of Emissions Is Urged, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24, 2016, at B2
(finding that manufacturers like Volkswagen and Renault cheat on their laboratory tests).
242. Another recent example of stifling voice is a security policy instituted by the
Arizona House of Representatives requiring extensive background checks on reporters
before they could get floor privileges. Access was changed after a reporter publicized a
lawmaker’s misdeeds. See Bob Christie, Arizona Rules Restrict Reporters Who Reject
Background Check, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 8, 2016, at A5 (recounting the House session that
discussed the rules regarding restriction of access for journalists); Richard Ruelas, Arizona
House Reverses Stand: Reporters Allowed on House Floor, ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Apr. 12,
2016), http://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/legislature/2016/04/12/arizona-housereverses-stand-reporters-allowed-house-floor/82935632/ [https://perma.cc/W5EF-G8ET]
(reporting on the change in policy for journalists).
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livestock operations.243 Some individuals get a job at one of these places in
order to gather evidence of objectionable procedures and practices.
Exposure can lead to enforcement actions by agencies and backlash from
consumers against the operators and owners.244 Ag-gag statutes vary but
generally make it a crime to gain unauthorized access to farming operations
and/or to record or film activities on a farm or agricultural operation unless
the individuals have the owner’s permission.245 States do not put many
resources into inspection and enforcement.246 For example, despite reports
of cruelty to pigs in Illinois’ 12 million pigs-a-year market, the Illinois
Bureau of Animal Health and Welfare found no animal welfare violations or
infractions from 2011 through 2016.247 Thus, issues have been successfully
raised by individuals taking jobs in organizations and secretly recording the
conditions and abuse.248
243. State Ag-Gag Laws, CONSTANTINE CANNON,
http://constantinecannon.com/whistleblower/whistleblower-ag-gag-laws
[https://perma.cc/B3F6-3DR4] (last visited Sept. 10, 2016) (defining ag-gag laws); Warren
Richey, ‘Ag-gag’ Laws Head to Court: So Far, Animal Rights Activists Are Winning,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Dec. 31, 2015),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2015/1231/Ag-gag-laws-head-to-court-So-faranimal-rights-activists-are-winning [https://perma.cc/BF4P-BWUB]. At least ten states
have “ag-gag” laws, and others are considering them. States with laws include Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Missouri, Montana, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.
Individuals have exposed conditions at a turkey farm, the whipping of cows, confinement of
hens, and treatment of animals at slaughterhouses. Many of the undercover videos and
reports have led to changes, sometimes from big corporations such as McDonalds that buy
the agricultural products. See, e.g., Johnathan Chew, Ex-McDonald’s Suppliers Plead
Guilty to Abusing Chickens, FORTUNE (Oct. 30, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/10/30/mcdonalds-chicken-abuse/ [https://perma.cc/86LB-RJKL]
(describing the animal cruelty incident associated with McDonald’s poultry providers and
McDonald’s subsequent pledge to no longer use chicken supplied by such means).
244. The chairman of Perdue Farms, one of the largest chicken suppliers in the U.S., is
now publicizing that, in response to changing consumer tastes and desires, they are stopping
the use of antibiotics. They are also going to put chickens to sleep before killing them and
their goal is to double the activity of their chickens in the next two years by putting
enhancements in their houses. Jim Perdue, Chickens Without Antibiotics, WALL ST. J., Oct.
17, 2016, at R10.
245. E.g., IOWA CODE § 717A.3A (2012) (detailing offenses related to agricultural
production); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-7042 (2014) (imposing penalties upon individuals who
knowingly interfere with agricultural production).
246. See David Jackson & Gary Marx, Whipped, Kicked, Beaten: Illinois Workers
Describe Abuse of Hogs, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 4, 2016,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/newswatchdog/pork/ct-pig-farms-abuse-met-20160802story.html [https://perma.cc/5LNQ-KWWW] (explaining that Illinois has just six inspectors
for all good animals—including pigs, chickens, and cows—who are responsible for how
animals are fed, confined, and medicated who also investigate reports of conditions in pet
stores and petting zoos, among others).
247. Id.
248. Id.
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North Carolina adopted a law allowing employers to pursue civil
charges against employees who, by gaining access to the nonpublic areas of
the employer’s facilities to take pictures, shoot video, or copy data or
documents, use this information “to breach the person’s duty of loyalty to
the employer.”249 If challenged, it is unlikely to be upheld. Breach of the
duty of loyalty was long ago found to be trumped by the public interest in
whistleblowing.250 However, the threat of a lawsuit and possible punitive
damages of up to $5,000 per day are likely to be a deterrent to employee
voice until the statute is successfully challenged.
Idaho was one of the first states to pass “ag-gag” legislation.251 The law
protected large agricultural operations, such as factory farms, by
criminalizing a common animal abuse and mistreatment whistleblower
tactic. The law made it a crime to obtain employment with an agricultural
production, use force, threat, misrepresentation or trespass to enter an
agricultural production facility, and obtain records of an agricultural
production, with the intent to cause economic injury to the facility’s
operations.252 Further, it criminalized entering an agricultural production
facility not open to the public and, without express consent from the facility’s
owner, making an audio or video recording of the conduct of the facilities’
operations.253
In August, 2015, the Idaho statute was struck down as a violation of the
Free Speech and Equal Protection Clauses.254 The judge found the law
“poses a particularly serious threat to whistleblowers’ free speech rights” and
circumvents established “whistleblowing statutes by punishing employees
for publishing true and accurate recordings on matters of public concern.”255
A key determinant in the ruling was the animus shown by legislators who
compared animal rights activists to “terrorists, persecutors, vigilantes,
blackmailers, and invading marauders who swarm into foreign territory and
destroy crops . . . .”256 So far, attempts to stifle employee speech and
249. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99A-2 (2016).
250. See Get Rich, supra note 223, at 333-34 (noting that the duty of loyalty has taken a
backseat to the protection and rights of employees in the whistleblowing context).
251. See IDAHO CODE ANN., supra note 245 (punishing misconduct related to animals and
agricultural production generally).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. See Animal Legal Def. Fund v. Otter, 118 F. Supp. 3d 1195, 1195 (D. Idaho 2015)
(holding that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated free speech protections and
equal protection).
255. Id. at 1208.
256. Id. at 1210. Wyoming has also enacted “ag-gag” legislation. WYO. STAT. ANN. §4027-101 (2015) (amended 2016). State legislators received complaints from ranchers about
environmentalists who went on their land to gather water samples to give to federal and state
agencies. Richey, supra note 243. The trespass statute was then amended to make it illegal
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whistleblowing have had mixed success.257
There is another precedent that can be called upon to overturn such
statutes. During the Civil Rights era of the 1960s and 1970s, “testers” were
used to gain evidence of housing and employment discrimination.258 For
example, in employment opportunities, a company would get two resumes
that were essentially identical except for the name. When the individuals
show up for an interview, one is black, and the other is white. If the employer
consistently chooses the white person, or tells the black applicant that the job
has just been filled, etc., that is used as evidence of discrimination.259 Most
courts eventually upheld such evidence despite the argument of lack of
standing because the person did not really want the job and therefore there
was no injury.260
to trespass on open land and/or private property with the intent to collect “resource data.” Dan
Frosch, Wyoming Trespassing Laws Under Fire, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2016, at A3. It
provides for consequential and economic damages as well as recovery of litigation costs.
WYO. STAT. ANN. §40-27-101 (2015) (amended 2016). The statute recently survived a
challenge to its constitutionality under the First Amendment right to free speech. “The
Supreme Court ‘has never held that a trespasser or an uninvited guest may exercise general
rights of free speech on property privately owned . . . .’” W. Watersheds Project v. Michael,
196 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1242 (D. Wyo. 2016). Other states have taken a different approach.
Colorado, for example, offers immunity for those who report animal abuse. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-9-209 (2005).
257. Indeed, they have even had some negative effects. For example, a study found that
“ag-gag” laws eroded trust in farmers and increased support for animal welfare legislation.
Andrew Amelinckx, New Study Finds “Ag-Gag” Laws Erode Trust in Farmers, MODERN
FARMER, Mar. 29, 2016, http://modernfarmer.com/2016/03/ag-gag-laws-erode-trust-farmers/
[https://perma.cc/87BM-BEWV] (stating that the reaction was as strong among the
demographic category of rural, conservative omnivores as among the category of urban,
liberal, vegetarians). The study also indicated a negative perception of how well farmers are
taking care of the environment. An earlier study of members of the cattle industry reported
that sixty percent of the 500 readers did not think “ag-gag” laws were a good idea to pursue.
Id. The study was published in BEEF Magazine. Id. Environmental groups and
photographers were upset by the passage of the Wyoming law, not just animal rights activists.
The National Press Photographers Association, among others, joined in a suit against it.
Frosch, supra note 256.
258. The tactics are still in use today. See Daniel Beekman, Landlords Accused of Biased
Practices, SEATTLE TIMES, May 3, 2016, at B1 (describing potential bias against renters after
Seattle’s Office for Civil Rights employed “testers” to expose illegal discrimination).
259. Similarly, if a white person and a black person, matched as evenly as possible, try to
rent an apartment and the white person is repeatedly chosen, that is evidence of discrimination.
See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 374 (1982) (detailing a specific injury
exists when a black person is told apartments are not available while a white person is told
there are vacancies).
260. See generally EEOC Notice, Enforcement Guidance: Whether “testers” Can File
Charges and Litigate Claims of Employment Discrimination, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (May 22, 1996), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/testers.html
[https://perma.cc/GN5A-EPJL] (establishing the Commission’s position that “testers” may
file charges and litigate the claims they bring).
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2. Provisions in Employment Contracts
One tactic used by employers to stifle whistleblowing is to require
applicants and employees to sign agreements requiring them to take all
disputes to arbitration. Many also require employees to not join class
actions. This practice grew after the Supreme Court in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams261 upheld a mandatory arbitration clause in a case involving
discrimination and tort claims.262 These agreements are under attack in
various ways.263 There have been several bills introduced in Congress to
overturn the Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams ruling, but they have been
unsuccessful.264 The NLRB has taken the position that arbitration
agreements banning class actions violate federal law guaranteeing the right
of workers to concerted activity.265 The Consumer Finance Protection
Bureau is seeking to ban mandatory arbitration clauses in many types of
consumer contracts.266 The Labor Department has issued a rule that will
allow investors to file class action lawsuits if they feel financial advisors
working on retirement accounts are not doing so in the best interests of their
clients.267 In general, however, the agreements are in effect. The

261. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, (2001).
262. Id. at 113-14 (finding that the Federal Arbitration Act covers not only commercial
contracts, but employment contracts as well). Between 2010 and 2014, the courts sent 470
worker lawsuits to arbitration, a 315 percent increase from the period 2005-2009. James von
Bergen, Employee vs. Employer: The Battle Over Arbitration, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 16, 2016,
at D7.
263. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, CFPB Proposes Prohibiting
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers their Day in Court, (May 05,
2016), http://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protectionbureau-proposes-prohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-theirday-court/ [https://perma.cc/Y22F-N98A] (specifying the need for prohibiting mandatory
arbitration clauses that deny consumers their day in court).
264. See Bishara et al, supra note 207, at 106-07 (detailing that many Congressional
Representatives introduced the Preservation of Civil Rights Protections Act, which would
overturn the decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams).
265. See von Bergen, supra note 262 (highlighting the position held by the National Labor
Relations Board that arbitration agreements that ban class actions violate federal laws
guaranteeing the right of workers to band together for protected concerted activity).
266. See Martha Neil, CFPB Seeks to Ban Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Disputes
over Banking, Credit Cards and Loans, A.B.A. J. (May 05, 2016),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/cfpb_seeks_to_ban_mandatory_arbitration_of_ban
king_credit_card_and_mortgage [https://perma.cc/P4B7-GX3Y] (stating that the Bureau has
passed a rule which will ban mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts).
267. See Andrew Ackerman and Leslie Scism, Obama Retirement-Savings Rule Faces
Industry-Led Court Battle, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2016,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/industry-groups-prepare-lawsuit-over-obama-retirement-rule1464704230 [https://perma.cc/UHF3-QXFP] (stating that the rule requires financial advisors
to act as fiduciaries).
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disadvantage to whistleblowers of mandatory arbitration is that they are
unlikely to get punitive damages. This leaves many whistleblowers who
suffer retaliation in essentially the same place as they were before the
whistleblower protection statutes were passed. They cannot sue in tort, and
the remedies in arbitration are inadequate. Additionally, employers are
shielded from publicity about their wrongdoing, so society also suffers; for
example, by preventing the public from understanding how prevalent certain
problems and practices are.
Covenants are used to stifle speech in other ways. The use of contract
law to try to suppress employee speech and whistleblowing is not new.
Brown & Williamson asserted a confidentiality agreement against the main
tobacco whistleblower in 1995, and Food Lion used similar agreements to
stop evidence of its practices.268 The use of such agreements grew rapidly in
the 1990s, and today they are almost ubiquitous. As noted, whistleblowing
protections also grew rapidly during this period, and today valid
whistleblowing is generally seen as trumping the interest in keeping the
information secret when litigated.269 This does not mean that organizations
no longer try to use them to stifle speech. The threat of a lawsuit can go far
in keeping someone silent. It can also keep those who are aware of the
threatened lawsuit against another person silent.
Perhaps in recognition of the ultimate futility of enforcing
confidentiality agreements against whistleblowers, companies are trying to
bolster their protection through additional agreements. For example, some
companies are trying to thwart whistleblowing by requiring employees to
sign agreements to forgo government whistleblower awards in order to be
eligible for severance pay or to receive a commission.270 The Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which has recently stressed the importance of
whistleblower information in helping to ensure protection for the securities
markets, is investigating these agreements because they create a chilling

268. See Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Buying Silence, 36 AM.
BUS. L. J. 151, 151-52 (1998) (detailing how an employer used a confidentiality agreement
against a former employee to prevent him from testifying about tobacco industry practices).
269. See Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games Dev. Corp., 414 F. Supp. 750, 763 (D.
N.J. 1976) (determining that it would be improper to enjoin a whistleblower when the
information they wish to share serves the public interest); see also EEOC v. Astra U.S.A.,
Inc., 929 F. Supp. 512, 518 (D. Mass. 1996) (noting an emerging judicial trend not to allow
private contractual agreements to thwart the public good), modified, 94 F. 3d 738 (1st Cir.
1996).
270. See Press Release, SEC, Company Punished for Severance Agreements that
Removed Financial Incentives for Whistleblowing, SEC (Aug 16, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-164.html [https://perma.cc/9WS3-TNX2]
(declaring a company that required employees to waive their ability to acquire money from
the SEC’s whistleblower program was fined $340,000).
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effect on reporting wrongdoing.271 A SEC Commissioner called it an
intimidation through “pre-taliation” rather than through retaliation.272 In one
case, the SEC brought an enforcement action against BlueLinx Holdings for
requiring outgoing employees to sign severance agreements that said they
waived their right to monetary recovery if they filed a complaint with the
SEC or other federal agency.273 In another case, it brought action against
KBR for including improperly restrictive language in confidentiality
agreements.274
It found the company in violation of Dodd-Frank
whistleblower provisions because the company “required witnesses in
certain internal investigations interviews to sign confidentiality statements
with language warning that they could face discipline and even be fired if
they discussed the matters with outside parties, without the prior approval of
KBR’s legal department.”275
3. Unrealistic Pressure on Employees: The Wells Fargo Example
Wells Fargo (Wells) was the king of cross selling among banks.276 It
was also employing a system of high pressure performance management
reinforcing an aggressive sales culture.277 The program strongly pushed
271. See Press Release, SEC, SEC: Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers in
Confidentiality Agreements, SEC (April 1, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-54.html [https://perma.cc/2VWN-XGNT]
[hereinafter Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers] (detailing the potential of the prenotification requirement in the confidentiality agreements and its discouragement effect).
272. See Erika Kelton, SEC Hits Back at KBR and Other Corporate Bullies Who
Threaten Whistleblowers, FORBES, (Apr. 2, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2015/04/02/sec-hits-back-at-kbr-and-othercorporate-bullies-who-threaten-whistleblowers/#54f39f5c1519 [https://perma.cc/3M88KMJP] (defining “pre-taliation” as a corporate strategy to preemptively curtail
whistleblowing through intimidation).
273. See Press Release, SEC, Company Paying Penalty for Violating Key Whistleblower
Protection Rule, SEC (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016157.html [https://perma.cc/G4LF-E9SV] (specifying how the agreement between BlueLinx
and its employees forced the employees to choose between possible whistleblower awards or
their severance pay and other post-employment benefits).
274. Companies Cannot Stifle Whistleblowers, supra note 271.
275. See id. (stating that KBR agreed to pay $130,000 in settlement and to change the
wording in its confidentiality agreements).
276. See Aaron Back, Wells Fargo’s Questionable Cross-Selling Strategy, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 9, 2016, at B12, http://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargos-questionable-cross-sellingstrategy-1473444334 [https://perma.cc/4G9L-8CKZ] (detailing how Wells Fargo opened
over half a million credit-card accounts its customers did not want).
277. See Michael Corkery & Stacy Cowley, Wells Fargo Warned Workers Against Sham
Accounts, but ‘They Needed a Paycheck’, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2016,
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/17/business/dealbook/wells-fargo-warned-workersagainst-fake-accounts-but-they-needed-a-
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employees to sign up customers for credit card accounts, overdraft
services,278 and other types of products. The pressure was so strong that
many employees created fake accounts for customers and signed them up for
things they did not want in order to meet sales goals.279 Employees
reportedly opened around two million credit card accounts which customers
may not have wanted.280
Several years before the settlement, the issue of fraudulent account
openings had become internally known and had been the subject of a story
in the Los Angeles Times.281 Wells eventually terminated 5,300 employees
for improper practices,282 held two-day ethics seminars and when the
wrongdoing continued, encouraged employees to report it.283 What Wells
did not do was change the very aggressive sales targets that led to the
problem, resulting in the wrongdoing continuing. Only several days after
widespread publicity and arranging settlements did Wells announce it was
revamping its compensation model—and then not until months later did it
actually do so.284
paycheck.html?action=click&contentCollection=DealBook&module=RelatedCoverage&reg
ion=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article [https://perma.cc/6UR2-KL9C] [hereinafter They Needed
a Paycheck] (proposing that the root cause of the sham accounts was the high sales goals
and management pushing the goals ever higher).
278. See Anna Maria Andriots & Emily Glazer, Wells Pushed Overdraft Services, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 11, 2016, at C1 (expounding how a regulation was passed in 2010 which required
banks to get customer permission for overdraft protection so the banks developed possibly
shady means to get said permission and subsequent fees).
279. See Emily Glazer, Wells Fargo Fined for Sales Scam, WALL ST. J., Sept. 9, 2016, at
A1 (stating that Well Fargo was hit with a $185 million fine for opening as many as 2 million
debit and credit-card accounts without customer approval). Employees also allegedly
transferred funds from authorized customer accounts to temporarily fund ones without
customer permission, sometimes resulting in fees for insufficient funds for the customer.
They also issued debit cards and assigned personal ID numbers without the customer’s
knowledge. Id.
280. Id. The fine Wells Fargo is paying in settlement is in part for opening those accounts.
Id.
281. See Brady Mullins, et al., How the Scandal Unfolded, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2016, at
A8 (noting an investigation in the Los Angeles Times). Whistleblowers had come forward
with information about the wrongdoing, but the government allegedly failed to investigate it.
See Liz Wagner & Mark Villareal, Former Federal Investigator Says Government Didn’t
Investigate Wells Fargo Whistleblower Cases, NBC BAY AREA (Oct. 18, 2016),
http://www.nbcbayarea.com/news/local/Former-Federal-Investigator-Says-GovernmentDidnt-Investigate-Wells-Fargo-Whistleblower-Cases-397518261.html
[https://perma.cc/E8US-MB7J] (detailing how two employees sent complaints to the
Whistleblower Protection Program under OSHA and the complaints went uninvestigated).
282. See They Needed a Paycheck, supra note 277 (detailing the number of number of
employees who lost their jobs).
283. See id. (describing measures taken by Wells Fargo to address the issues it was facing).
284. See id. (highlighting the change in compensation structure to deemphasize hitting
sales goals).
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Even further, the Chief Executive of Wells, John Stumpf, blamed the
staff for the wrongdoing.285 Wells may have provided avenues for
whistleblowing and instructed employees as to what wrongdoing the
executives were most concerned with, but not changing the incentives and
pushing the responsibility for the wrongdoing to the lowest levels by the
CEO did nothing to build the trust necessary to encourage voice. In fact, one
could argue that it did just the opposite—provided an organizationallysanctioned incentive for silence.
The fallout from the company’s actions continues. Wells has agreed to
pay a $185 million fine in settlement with the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau286 and has also settled with the Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency and the City Attorney of Los Angeles.287 It is under investigation
by Congress and at least three states.288 Wells’ stock price has fallen, the
chairman and CEO has resigned,289 and customer applications for credit
cards and checking accounts have fallen by twenty and twenty-five percent,
respectively.290
Misconduct, like that of Wells Fargo’s, is a “systemic risk” in the
financial and banking industries.291 To properly mitigate this risk, companies

285. See Emily Glazer and Christina Rexrode, Wells Boss Says Staff at Fault for Scams,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 14, 2016, at A1 (noting the top two bankers at the bank blamed the rank
and file staff members for the scandal).
286. See They Needed a Paycheck, supra note 277 (stating the penalty assessed against
Wells Fargo for their behavior). The fine is the largest ever assessed by the CFPB. Alistar
Gray, Record Fine for Wells Fargo After Staff Set Up Secret Accounts to Hit Sales Goals, FIN.
TIMES, Sept. 8, 2016, at 1.
287. See Yuka Hayashi, Wells Fargo Is Getting Heat, WALL ST. J., Sept. 17 - 18, 2016, at
B2 (describing the settlement with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
288. See id. (noting that California also is investigating Wells for identity theft); James
Rufus Koren, California Attorney General Investigating Wells Fargo on Allegations of
Criminal Identity Theft, LA TIMES, Oct. 18, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fiwells-fargo-harris-20161018-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/KZ9A-L6BZ] (pointing at the
creation of unauthorized accounts as criminal identity theft).
289. See Emily Glazer, Wells Chief Quits Under Attack, WALL ST. J., Oct. 13, 2016, at A1
(stating the CEO has resigned).
290. See Aaron Back, Wells Fargo Enters Fog of Uncertainty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14,
2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/wells-fargo-enters-fog-of-uncertainty-1476468212
[https://perma.cc/P62M-SRA9] (noting a twenty-five percent slump in new checking
accounts being opened and a twenty percent slump in new credit cards when compared to
the prior year).
291. See Julia-Ambra Verlaine, Carney: Misconduct Is a ‘Systemic Risk’, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 1, 2016, at C3 (stating the frequency of banking misconduct can lead to great systemic
risk in financial institutions and markets). After bringing charges against Wells Fargo, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has asked large and regional banks for information
about their incentive compensation and sales practices. See Emily Glazer & Christina
Rexrode, Banks Sales Draw Inquiry, WALL ST. J., October 26, 2016, at C3 (describing the
OCC’s interest in formally getting the large and midsize banks’ sales practices).
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need employees to speak up. But before they will, they must have some
investment and trust in the organization. Rather than set unrealistic goals
and routinely get rid of employees who do not meet them, it would be far
better to lead with buy-in from below, and encourage rather than punish.
IV.

PROPOSALS FOR WORKPLACE PRACTICES

At-will employment as well as ag-gag legislation and contractual
provisions requiring arbitration for the resolution of all disputes are external
forces that disincentivize the exercise of employee voice. Because a
meaningful opportunity to have voice in the workplace is important to
employees, the employer, and society, external barriers that may make
employee voice less likely should be countered with internal processes and
practices that are aimed at facilitating upward communication of concerns
by employees. There are several actions employers can take to encourage
employees to speak up.
A first step in promoting employee voice is to have strong statements
and support from top management encouraging employees to raise their
concerns and stressing a non-retaliation policy. This should have a
prominent place in materials provided to new hires, and it should also be
republished annually to all employees.292 To bolster the company’s policy,
there should be a summary of activity in that annual message and details
regarding how various issues brought to the attention of management were
resolved.293 It should also include measures taken against those who
retaliated against employees who reported. Training should include what the
organization considers wrongful and how to deal with it.
Furthermore, someone high in the organization should be appointed to
monitor the reporting system. There should be more than one reporting
channel in case one of the designated monitors is involved in the
wrongdoing.294 Many companies have established hot lines to receive
292. See Marcia Miceli et al, A Word to the Wise: How Managers and Policy-Makers can
Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing, 86 J. BUS. ETHICS 379, 383-85 (2008)
[hereinafter A Word to the Wise] (explaining the importance of training on raising concerns,
avoiding retaliation, and realizing when retaliation is occurring).
293. For example, this could be done by category—e.g., 250 issues were raised regarding
disputes between coworkers or dissatisfaction with supervisor actions (studies have shown
that these kinds of “personnel” issues are the most common kinds raised). Co-worker disputes
were mediated, and X percent were resolved to the parties’ satisfaction. Also, X percent were
still in discussion.
294. See A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 388 (explaining the importance of
multiple, effective communication channels). There is likely to be such a system in place in
larger organizations because this an EEOC best practice for sexual harassment legal
compliance. See Best Practices For Employers and Human Resources/EEO Professionals,
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION,
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reports in response to SOX.295 The presumed advantage of this is anonymity
for the whistleblower.296 Investigation of complaints should be swift and
thorough. To the extent possible, the identity of the reporter should be
protected, if so requested. The reporter should be kept informed of what is
going on, including the result of the investigation. Measures taken against a
retaliator should be commensurate with the retaliation.
In addition, the employer should incentivize employees to report
wrongdoing. This need not be monetary.297 Building incentives into the
organization’s reward structure may help the employer avoid the detriments
of external whistleblowing.298 “[O]bservers of wrongdoing consider the
costs and benefits of acting, along with other factors. The simplest
interpretation of motivational theory would suggest that providing valued
employer rewards for internal whistle-blowing would increase its frequency
. . . .”299 It would also emphasize the employer’s desire for the activity. For
example, sharing stories of how an individual who helped the organization
address a problem got promoted would help employees see that speaking up
about problems was valued in the organization.
An organization can have the best procedures and guidelines in place
but without another feature—trust—they will not be used. Employees must
trust that if they report, they will be taken seriously, something will be done,
and negative consequences will not follow. To increase the probability that
employees will “trust” their managers to respond positively to their concerns,
it may be helpful to train managers on the causes and consequences of
employee silence so that they have more empathy for their employees’
worries about speaking up. It may also be helpful to train managers on how
to respond when an employee speaks up about a problem or concern. If

https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/initiatives/e-race/bestpractices-employers.cfm
[https://perma.cc/Y9L5-F8MV] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (detailing the complaint process).
SOX has also made the adoption of established whistleblowing mechanisms necessary for
all publicly traded companies. 15 U.S.C. §78j-1.
295. See SOX and Whistleblowing, supra note 214, at 1761 (“[T]he organizational
response to this requirement has been to contract with an independent hotline company to
receive the reports.”); see also A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 388 (noting the
existence of international hotlines for anonymous whistleblowing).
296. See A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 387-89 (describing how one of the
obstacles to employees internally blowing the whistle is lack of trust and fear or retaliation,
and how anonymity can help solve those hurdles).
297. While large monetary awards have resulted in an increase whistleblowing, see
discussion of the False Claims Act and its progeny above, something as simple as a prime
parking space with the employee’s name on it could reinforce the message.
298. A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 380 (describing the benefits of internal
whistleblowing, including saving the firm’s reputation and protection from legal and
legislative responses to the wrongdoing).
299. Id. at 386.
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managers are trained on what to do with information that suggests a need to
take action, formal whistleblowing may not be needed.300
The rethinking of raises and bonuses can also encourage voice. For
example, an employee who saves the company money through reporting that
leads to the uncovering of embezzlement, could be given a percentage of the
savings as a bonus.301 Information about illegal activity that helps stop it has
many benefits to the company, some intangible, such as avoidance of
negative publicity. This is also worthy of a monetary award. This person
could also be identified as a valuable employee through a monthly
assessment, and cited as someone who should move forward.302 Many
companies already give incentives for useful suggestions,303 and the monthly
meetings may be a more regularized way of capturing the information if
suggestions are solicited and rewarded.
CONCLUSION
Increased opportunities for employees to voice their concerns in the
workplace may result in increased job satisfaction and increased employee
retention. The increased sense of control associated with employee voice is
also linked to other positive outcomes such as increased physical and
psychological well-being.For these reasons, it is paramount that
organizations find ways to facilitate employee voice.
To facilitate voice in the workplace, managers should create policies
and structures that facilitate employees’ sense of belonging and commitment
to the well-being of the organization.304 Employees should also be incenti
vized to “speak up” about issues or problems they encounter in the workplace
so as to overcome the perceived structural barriers to voice and the perceived
risks of whistleblowing. Any attempt to increase worker voice and whistle
blowing should be done carefully and thoroughly, as these changes, if
improperly implemented, can lead to even more silence and wrongdoing.
300. See Lauren Weber, At Kimberly-Clark, ‘Dead Wood’ Workers Have Nowhere to
Hide, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 2016, at A1 (explaining that Kimberly-Clark provides training
sessions on giving and receiving difficult feedback).
301. See A Word to the Wise, supra note 292, at 385-86 (detailing one way to incentivize
whistleblowing).
302. See, e.g., Rachel Emma Silverman, Companies Rethink Annual Pay Raises, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 23, 2016, at B6 (stating that the Chief Executive of BetterWorks reviews
employee compensation every month and makes adjustments if necessary).
303. See J.B. Arthur & C.L. Huntley, Ramping up the Organizational Learning Curve:
Assessing the Impact of Deliberate Learning on Organizational Performance Under
Gainsharing, 48 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1159, 1159 (2005) (examining the relationship between
gainsharing and helpful suggestions).
304. See Employee Voice and Silence, supra note 21, at 180 (highlighting the need for an
internal sense of commitment to improvement and assistance).

